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ABSTRACT 
WORRY IN CHILDREN: PROPOSAL AND TEST OF A COGNITIVE MODEL 
Sarah Jane Kertz 
September 10th, 2010 
Although worry is common in children, little is known about its development and 
maintenance. The current study reviews several areas of the literature to inform a 
comprehensive cognitive model of clinical worry in children. Parental influences on child 
anxiety broadly are reviewed, followed by a discussion of empirically supported 
cognitive models of worry in adult samples. Next, the potential impact of cognitive 
development on childhood worry is presented. A cognitive model is then proposed, and 
empirical support for the model is reviewed. Finally, a portion of the model is identified 
and tested empirically. Specifically, this study tests the hypothesis that cognitive 
development will predict the cognitive variables of threat interpretation, beliefs about 
worry, negative problem orientation, and intolerance of uncertainty (IU). It is also 
hypothesized that the cognitive variables will predict worry and that this association will 
be moderated by child development, such that the predictive power of the cognitive 
variables increases with child development. It was also hypothesized that female children 
will score higher than male children on the four cognitive variables and on measures of 
worry. Finally, it was predicted that scores on the cognitive variables will discriminate 
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children with clinical levels of worry from those with nonclinicallevels of worry. 
Children were recruited from public and private schools. A total of 80 children between 
the ages of 8 and 12 years completed the study. Overall, hypotheses were partially 
supported. Cognitive development, as measured by child age, explained variance in 
intolerance of uncertainty, negative problem orientation, and negative beliefs about 
worry. Intolerance of uncertainty, negative problem orientation, and negative beliefs 
about worry significantly predicted worry, and negative beliefs about worry emerged as 
the strongest predictor. Threat interpretation and positive beliefs about worry were not 
correlated with worry. Female children reported higher levels of negative beliefs about 
worry and negative problem orientation, but not worry. Finally, intolerance of 
uncertainty, negative beliefs about worry, and negative problem orientation discriminated 
clinical from nonclinicallevels of worry. Exploratory analyses examined potential 
developmental trends in associations between the cognitive variables and worry. Findings 
are discussed in terms of theoretical and clinical implications and suggestions for future 
research are offered. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Worry is common in both children and adults. As many as 70% of children in a 
community sample report worry about a number of things (Orton, 1982) and 30% report 
subclinical levels of worry (Bell-Dolan, Last, & Strauss, 1990). Although childhood 
worry itself is not unusual, worry that is excessive, uncontrollable, and associated with 
distress is considered a clinical concern. Such worry is the cardinal feature of Generalized 
Anxiety Disorder (GAD) in both children and adults. Prevalence estimates of GAD in 
children suggest that the disorder is not uncommon, with rates ranging from .16% to 
8.8% of community samples (Cartwright-Hatton, 2006). GAD has a chronic course, and 
many adults report that their worries began in childhood (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000). The frequency, associated distress, and persistence of childhood 
worry highlight the importance of understanding this issue. 
Although GAD is a chronic disorder frequently beginning early in life, little is 
known about specific etiological or maintaining factors of worry in children. To date 
most work has examined the content of child worry and patterns of associated symptoms 
described in DSM-IV (e.g., Hale, Raaijmakers, Muris, van Hoof, & Meeus, 2008; Muris, 
Merckelbach, & Luijten, 2002; Silverman, La Greca, & Wasserstein, 1995; Tracey, 
Chorpita, Douban, & Barlow, 1997; Vasey, Crnic, & Carter, 1994; Weems, Silverman, & 
La Greca, 2000). Exciting new work has examined the role of cognitive factors in 
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adolescents (Gosselinet ai., 2007; Laugesen, Dugas, & Bukowski, 2003) and shed light 
on the applicability of adult cognitive models to younger populations. Still, work with 
children is rare and the impact of cognitive development on models of worry has yet to be 
fully explored (see Ellis & Hudson, 2010, for an exception). Currently, most researchers 
and clinicians borrow models from the adult literature, operating under the assumption 
that a downward extension of these models is appropriate for children. 
Although downward extensions are common, applying adult models to children 
without empirical testing is problematic for several reasons. First, it has been suggested 
that childhood psychopathology is generally understood best in terms of the broader 
family interaction pattern (Dadds, 1987; Patterson & Reid, 1984). For children, a 
significant amount of time is spent in the home and with the family, where parents play 
an important role in shaping children's beliefs, perceptions, and experiences. A failure to 
consider the role of parents in childhood anxiety may lead to an incomplete 
understanding of the disorder. Second, children differ from adults in terms of their 
cognitive, emotional, and social development. Until late adolescence, children grow and 
develop cognitively. Whether such abilities impact the experience or expression of 
childhood worry is not well understood. For example, children's ability to conceptualize 
the future and elaborate on potential threat may impact their capacity for experiencing 
generalized anxiety (Vasey, 1993). Models of childhood worry should consider if the 
cognitive variables implicated in adult models are important for models of children's 
worry and test hypotheses to determine if development affects the extent to which such 
models apply. 
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Applying adult models to child anxiety without testing is also problematic 
because such models guide the development of treatment interventions. Without testing 
whether adult models accurately capture the experience of worry in children, treatments 
may be less effective. For example, some evidence suggests that current cognitive 
behavioral interventions are successful for only 60% of anxious children (Cartwright-
Hatton, Roberts, Chitsabesan, Fothergill, & Harrington, 2004). To date, no cognitive-
behavioral treatment targeted specifically at youth with GAD exists (Albano & Hack, 
2004). A comprehensive and well-defined model of GAD and worry in children will 
provide clear targets for treatment and identify processes that may be altered. An 
understanding of the causal factors could allow for the prevention of clinical worry 
before it becomes problematic (Field et aI., 2008). Incorporating the role of parenting in 
particular could contribute to such prevention or treatment. 
This paper examines several areas of the literature in order to propose a model of 
clinical worry in children and an initial empirical examination of portions of the model. 
First, the influence of parenting on childhood anxiety disorders broadly is reviewed. 
Conceptual models of the process and maintenance of worry in adults are then briefly 
examined. Because no models of worry specific to children currently exist, adult models 
will be discussed. Drawing from these two literatures, a model of worry in children is 
proposed, integrating process and maintenance variables along with parental influences. 
To address the impact of children's emerging cognitive abilities on proposed 
associations, the influences of cognitive development on the model are also hypothesized. 
Existing empirical support for the model is then reviewed followed by specific 
hypotheses for the current study. 
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1. Parenting in Childhood Anxiety 
Research has consistently shown that anxiety is familial (Schreier, Wittchen, 
Hofler, & Lieb, 2008; Torgersen, 1983; Turner, Beidel, & Costello, 1987). Genetics play 
an important role in the transmission of anxiety, and the genetic contribution explains 
approximately one-third of the variance in child anxiety (Eley, 2001). A substantial 
portion of variance remains unexplained by heritable characteristics, however, allowing 
for the exploration of environmental factors such as parenting. Craske (1999) has 
suggested that parenting contributes to child anxiety through both parenting styles 
broadly and parenting behaviors more specifically. Interestingly, reviews of the influence 
of parenting styles have not shown significant consistent relationships with child anxiety 
(Wood et aI., 2003), and recent work has focused more specifically on parenting 
behaviors. Although the bulk of this literature is not focused explicitly on worry, it 
nonetheless informs our understanding of parental influences on children's anxiety across 
a variety of anxiety symptoms. In addition, it is also important to consider if certain 
aspects of parenting are uniquely related to childhood worry and this smaller literature 
specific to worry will be reviewed later. 
1.1 Parental behaviors 
The relationship between parenting behaviors and childhood anxiety has received 
significant attention in the literature over the last decade and several narrative reviews 
and meta-analyses have consolidated results from a range of studies using various 
methods and designs. Studies of parenting and child anxiety have mostly considered 
dimensions of warmth and control and have used three methods for assessing parenting: 
child report of parenting, parent report of parenting, and observation .. Wood et al. 's 
4 
(2003) comprehensive review included studies of 1) parental control, defined as 
excessive regulation of children's activities, parental decision making, overprotection, 
and instructions on how to think and feel, and 2) parental acceptance, defined as parental 
warmth, responsiveness, and involvement with children. Overall, results showed the 
most consistent effects for parental control and mixed support for acceptance, with 
stronger associations found in studies using an observational methodology. Fourteen 
studies of parent control using child report of parental behavior and parent report of their 
own parenting yielded inconclusive results. Six studies using observational methods, 
however, showed that parents of anxious or shy children were more controlling and 
granted less autonomy than parents of nonanxious children. Most (8 of 10) tests revealed 
were significant and all but one effect size was considered medium or large. The majority 
of tests from studies using child or parent report of parental acceptance also failed to 
show significant associations with child anxiety, although five observational studies (8 of 
18 tests) showed significant effects. Another review of work published after Wood et 
al. 's review focused on parental control, defined as excessive regulation of children's 
activities, vigilance and intrusion, and discouragement of independent problem solving, 
and negativity, characterized by the absence of warmth and acceptance, criticism, and 
rejection (Bogels & Brechman-Toussaint, 2006). The authors identified additional 
observational studies supporting the relation between parental control and child anxiety, 
but results from observational studies of parental warmth were inconsistent. 
Due to the difficulty in quantifying results and effects using narrative reviews, 
several meta-analyses have also examined relationships between parenting behaviors and 
child anxiety. A meta-analysis of 47 studies found a medium effect size for the 
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relationship between parental control and childhood anxiety (McLeod, Weisz, & Wood, 
2007). The authors dismantled the construct of rejection, defined as low levels of warmth, 
approval, and responsiveness, and the construct of control, defined as excessive 
regulation, encouragement of dependence on parents, and instruction on how to think and 
feel. Resulting subdimensions included warmth, withdrawal, aversiveness, 
overinvolvement, and autonomy-granting. Results showed that autonomy-granting and 
overinvolvement explained the greatest proportion of variance in childhood anxiety This 
work underscores the importance of careful definition of constructs and examinations of 
specific elements of parenting that may related differentially to child anxiety. However, 
overall parental rejection and control explained only a small amount of variance in child 
anxiety (4% and 6%, respectively), prompting the authors to suggest that perhaps 
parenting plays a smaller role than many theories suggest. Another recent meta-analysis 
of 17 observational studies further examined the relationship between parenting 
constructs and child anxiety (van der Bruggen, Starns, & Bogels, 2008). They reported a 
medium to large effect size for the association between parental control and child anxiety. 
The authors also identified a number of moderator variables that resulted in larger effect 
sizes, including child gender, child age, socioeconomic status, and type of interaction task 
used to measure parenting. The authors conclude that their results do not support a direct 
parent-to-child transmission of anxiety through parental behaviors, as parental control 
was not strongly associated with parental anxiety. 
1.2. Modeling of anxiety 
Parental modeling of anxiety and fear related behaviors has also been identified as 
a risk factor for the development of childhood anxiety. Although the hypothesis is 
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commonly discussed in theoretical terms, the role of social learning in the transmission of 
anxiety has received surprisingly little empirical attention. It stands to reason that 
exposure to a parent's anxious behavior will influence children's interpretation of threat, 
cognition about new or threatening situations, and preferred coping strategies. 
Several methods have been used to examine parental modeling, including 
behavioral tasks, naturalistic observation, and discussion based tasks. In one behavioral 
study, researchers presented toddlers ages 15 to 20 months with a stimulus-maternal 
reaction pair (Gerull & Rapee, 2002). Stimuli were two toys paired with either a 
happy/encouraging maternal response or a fearful/disgusted maternal response. Children 
showed greater avoidance behavior of the toy paired with the negative maternal reaction 
and displayed more fearful affect after a negative maternal reaction trial. Children 
continued to display the fear response one minute and ten minutes after the initial 
modeling trial, suggesting that there is some lasting effect of exposure to parental 
behaviors and affect. 
Naturalistic observations of sequential parent-child behaviors also support the 
modeling hypothesis. Mothers and their children ages 4 to 10 years were observed in the 
waiting room of a pediatric clinic (Greenbaum et aI., 1988). Behaviors were coded for 
maternal emotion, maternal problem focused behavior, and child distress. Using 
sequential analysis, results showed that in dyads with high trait anxious mothers, 
maternal agitation was more likely to precede child distress, a result not found for low 
trait anxious mothers. In dyads with low trait anxious mothers child distress was more 
likely to be followed by maternal agitation. 
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Additional support for the importance of modeling comes from discussion based 
studies hypothesizing that parental language models an anxious cognitive style for 
children, increasing their risk for an anxiety disorder. In a study of mother-child 
interactions, anxious mothers used more catastrophizing language with their anxiety 
disordered children than nonanxious mothers (Whaley, Pinto, & Sigman, 1999). Another 
study found that anxious mothers were more likely to catastrophize than nonanxious 
mothers, regardless of the anxiety status of their children and for nonanxious mothers, 
having an anxious child increased the likelihood of maternal catastrophizing 
(Moore et aI., 2004). However, a more recent study failed to find differences between 
anxious and nonanxious groups. Discussions between children 8 to 13 years, half of 
whom met criteria for an anxiety disorder, and their parents were analyzed for verbal 
content (Suveg et aI., 2008). Families were instructed to discuss times when the child felt 
anxious, angry, and happy. Overall, results did not support thy hypothesis that parental 
language was related to child anxiety. The only significant anxiety related difference 
emerged for mothers with their sons, with nonanxious mothers engaging in more 
explanatory discussion of emotion in anxious situations compared to anxious mothers. 
1.3 Discussion 
Despite a large body of work investigating the influence of parenting behavior on 
child anxiety, unequivocal support has yet to emerge. Recent reviews and meta-analyses 
suggest that perhaps parents playa less prominent role in their children's anxiety than 
many theories would suggest (McLeod et aI., 2007). There may be several explanations 
for these findings. First, methodological factors and sample characteristics may have not 
have been fully considered in the analyses, as several studies have found support for 
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these variables as moderators of the relation between parenting and child anxiety 
(McLeod, et aI., 2007; van der Bruggen et aI., 2008). For example, several authors have 
pointed out that when observational studies alone are considered, effects for parenting are 
greater than when all study types are considered together. Second, specific definition and 
measurement of parenting behaviors are needed. For example, although McLeod et ai. 
(2007) found that parenting overall accounted for only 4% of the variance in childhood 
anxiety, parental autonomy-granting specifically accounted for 18%. This suggests that 
significant effects could be washed out by collapsing several types of behaviors into 
larger categories. 
Given the overall inconsistent findings and stated limitations, there are some 
important findings to date. Parental control, and autonomy-granting in particular, shows 
stronger and more consistent relationships with child anxiety compared to parental 
warmth (Bogels & Brechman-Toussaint, 2006; McLeod, et aI., 2007; van der Bruggen, et 
aI., 2008; Wood, et aI., 2003), suggesting that this is an important variable and worthy of 
further consideration. It has been hypothesized (Chorpita & Barlow, 1998) that 
controlling and intrusive parenting conveys negative messages to children about their 
abilities. Children could interpret parental intrusiveness as an indicator that they do not 
have adequate skills to cope. Alternatively, parental control could prevent children from 
engaging in novel or challenging experiences where coping strategies might normally 
develop. 
More work is needed to fully understand the effects of parental modeling of 
behavior and verbal modeling of cognitions. The few available studies of modeling 
suggest that parent's negative behavior or negative verbalizations may be copied by 
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children. Although intriguing, these data need to be replicated and theoretical models for 
the impact of modeling on child anxiety specifically developed and tested. These results 
could have important implications for children of anxious parents who may deliver 
negative information or model negative and/or avoidant cognitions about novel 
experiences more frequently than nonanxious parents. Repeated exposure to parental 
anxious behavior could contribute to stable attributions and beliefs in children. The 
literature to date, however, on the effect of parental verbalization on children's anxiety is 
limited. 
Finally, several issues must be considered when interpreting this work. First, the 
bidirectional nature of parent-child interactions cannot be ignored. Children undoubtedly 
influence their parent's behavior and affect, eliciting certain responses. The contributions 
of both members of the dyad will better inform our current understanding of the role of 
parents. Second, the design of future studies should give more consideration to potential 
moderators, such as parent and child gender, child developmental stage, and child 
temperament. As discussed, these factors could alter relationships between variables, and 
if not considered, mask potential effects. In addition, the influence of fathers on 
children's psychological well-being has been largely ignored. Understanding parental 
influences on children should include the unique contributions of both mother and father. 
Effects may differ for mothers and fathers, and the inclusion of both parent and child sex 
would provide a more comprehensive understanding of these relationships. Finally, most 
studies have included only traditional nuclear families. Many children today split their 
time between several households that include stepparents, stepsiblings, and half -siblings. 
Understanding the influence of parenting in environments when mothers and fathers are 
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not living together and when stepparents are involved in child rearing would be beneficial 
in understanding the modem parent-child dynamic. 
2. Adult models of GAD 
Worry and GAD in adults have received increasing attention over the last 15 
years. Worry has been conceptualized as a largely cognitive process. As such, most 
research, though not all, has emphasized the role of cognitive and metacognitive factors 
in worry and several theoretical models have been proposed. These models have been 
well supported empirically and in some cases have led to the development of specific 
interventions (see Behar et aI., 2009 for a review). Although the child literature lags well 
behind the adult literature in this area, researchers are beginning to examine the role of 
cognitive factors and cognitive development in adolescent worry. By and large, however, 
the models remain untested in school age children. The next section reviews the 
empirically supported adult models of GAD and worry, with findings relevant to 
adolescents or children included when available. 
2.1 Avoidance model 
Borkovec's (1994) avoidance model was one of the earliest conceptualizations of 
worry. He defined worry as a verbal stream of uncontrollable, negative thoughts directed 
toward potential future threats. At the heart of Borkovec's model is the notion that worry 
functions as a form of avoidance. Individuals with GAD report that worry helps to avoid 
threat by making future negative events less likely or by preventing such events entirely 
(Borkovec, 1994). Because the likelihood of most feared events is relatively small to 
begin with, these beliefs about worry are negatively reinforced. Individuals with GAD 
also report that they use worry as a method of distraction and for avoiding deeper, more 
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emotionally laden content or threat (Borkovec, 1994). Physiological studies provide 
additional support for patients' report that worry serves as avoidance. Work in this area 
has documented a restricted range of physiological activity associated with worry 
described as autonomic inflexibility, or a lower range of variability in physiological 
responses (Borkovec & Hu, 1990; Lyonfields, Borkovec, & Thayer, 1995; Thayer, 
Friedman, & Borkovec, 1996). Borkovec and colleagues (1998) suggest that it is the 
predominantly verbal nature of worry that results in reduced vagal activity, as verbal 
thoughts elicit lower cardiovascular response than images of the same content. The 
suppression of autonomic responses has important implications for the maintenance of 
worry. If worrying inhibits physiological response, habituation to feared stimuli cannot 
be achieved (Borkovec & Lyonfields, 1993), suggesting that worry works in much the 
same way as other avoidance strategies, preventing exposure and perpetuating anxious 
meanings (Borkovec, 1994). 
2.2. Beliefs about worry and metaworry 
Several models have posited that metacognition plays a fundamental role in 
development and maintenance of clinical worry. Wells (1995) emphasized the 
importance of metacognitive beliefs about both the process and content of worry. His 
model includes positive metabeliefs about the usefulness of worry, negative metabeliefs 
about the dangers of and uncontrollability of worry, and metaworry. He proposes that 
positive metabeliefs lead to Type 1 worry, or content based worries about events. This 
worry then becomes intrusive and bothersome, activating negative beliefs about the 
danger of worry, which in tum lead to metaworry, or Type 2 worry. Metaworry is 
reinforced by related changes in behavior, attempts to control the worry, and negative 
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emotion. He suggests that worry becomes problematic when metaworry develops, leading 
to perseveration and attempts to control the worry. An empirical examination of the 
model largely supported the hypotheses, showing that when both worry types and trait 
anxiety were used to predict worry or ratings of worry interference, trait anxiety and 
Type 2 worry emerged as significant predictors (Wells & Carter, 1999). 
Other researchers have focused on positive and negative beliefs about worry. 
Freeston et aI. (Freeston, Rheaume, Letarte, & Dugas, 1994) developed a measure, the 
Why Worry? scale, to examine reasons people worry. Results revealed two factors, 
consisting of 1) beliefs that worry helps to facilitate cognitive avoidance, reduces the 
chance of negative outcomes, and reduces the consequence of negative outcomes, and 2) 
beliefs that worry helps to increase control and facilitate problem solving. Another study 
(Davey, Tallis, & Capuzzo, 1996) of beliefs about worry found two higher order factors 
of positive consequences, including two first order factors of "worry motivates" and 
"worry helps analytic thinking," and negative consequences, including three first order 
factors of "worrying disrupts effective performance," "worrying exaggerates the 
problem," and "worrying causes emotional discomfort." They also found that individuals 
who scored high on both the positive and negative consequences scales reported higher 
levels of worry and depression, more worry domains, poorer general health, and more 
negative automatic thoughts than those who scored lower on one or both scales. Beliefs 
about worry have also been shown to discriminate clinical from normal levels of worry 
(Freeston et aI., 1994). 
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2.3 Intolerance of uncertainty 
Intolerance of uncertainty (ill) is another cognitive variable that has been linked 
with worry in adults. Intolerance of uncertainty is defined as a negative response, 
including emotional, cognitive, and behavioral reactions, to situations or events 
interpreted as ambiguous (Buhr & Dugas, 2006). More specifically, intolerance of 
uncertainty reflects a set of beliefs that uncertainty is stressful, upsetting, interferes with 
functioning, and that being uncertain about the future is unfair (Buhr & Dugas, 2002). 
Intolerance of uncertainty has been shown to discriminate participants who, based on 
self-report, met full criteria for GAD, met the somatic criteria only, and met no GAD 
criteria (Buhr & Dugas, 2002). Intolerance of uncertainty also appears to have a unique 
relationship with worry. In a study with undergraduate students, Buhr and Dugas (2006) 
found that intolerance of uncertainty remained positively correlated with worry even after 
controlling for intolerance of ambiguity, perfectionism, and perceived control. This study 
also showed that intolerance of uncertainty explained additional variance in worry scores 
above and beyond demographics and other study variables. 
2.4. Problem solving and problem orientation 
In addition to work on metacognition and worry, others have examined relations 
between problem solving and worry. Davey (1994) defines worry as a continuous, 
unsuccessful attempt to solve a problem. Worry is associated with the information-
seeking coping strategy of monitoring, characterized as vigilance for potential threat-
related information (Davey, Hampton, Farrell, & Davidson, 1992). Davey (1994) 
suggests that a monitoring style of problem solving is particularly problematic when the 
threat is uncontrollable, and consistent monitoring likely contributes to worry 
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maintenance when the problem is not easily solvable. Early hypotheses suggested that 
worriers lacked adequate problem solving skills; however, later work found that worry 
was related to poor problem-solving confidence and lower perceived control over the 
problem solving process, but there was no relation with problem-solving effectiveness 
(Davey, 1994). Another study showed that participants who received poor feedback about 
their problem solving solutions (regardless of their true performance) reported lower 
problem solving confidence, which in tum was associated with more catastrophizing 
steps during a worry interview (Davey, Jubb, & Cameron, 1996). Based on these 
findings, the relation between worry and problem solving has less to do with actual skill 
set and more to do with beliefs and attributions about one's competence and ability to 
cope with problems when they arise. 
Problem orientation, a closely related construct, also shows strong associations 
with clinical worry in adults. Ladouceur and colleagues (1998) define problem 
orientation as an individual's set of potential responses when confronted with a problem, 
as well as the metacognitive activity that characterizes an individual's approach to 
dealing with problems. One study found that nonclinical moderate worriers, nonclinical 
subjects meeting GAD symptom criteria by questionnaire, and GAD patients showed no 
difference in problem solving skills; however, the two GAD groups reported poorer 
problem orientation than the moderate worrier group (Ladouceur et aI., 1998). Building 
on these results, Robichaud and Dugas (2005) investigatedworry and depression relation 
specifically to negative problem orientation, defined as beliefs about threat of problems 
to well-being, doubt about problem solving ability, and pessimism about the problem 
resolution. After controlling for pessimism, self-mastery, and neuroticism, negative 
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problem orientation predicted more variance in worry than depression and discriminated 
between high and low worriers. Another study included subdimensions of problem 
orientation, including emotional, cognitive, and behavioral orientation and found that of 
the three, only emotional problem orientation predicted worry (Dugas, Freeston, & 
Ladouceur, 1997). 
2.5 Information processing 
Another cognitive variable, information processing, has also been linked with 
worry in adults. Models of worry in adults have emphasized the importance of 
information processing, suggesting that it serves as a causal and/or maintaining factor in 
GAD. This work has used several different paradigms, and overall results suggest that 
GAD is associated with attentional bias and the tendency to interpret ambiguous 
information as threatening. Results from dot-probe tasks indicate that those with GAD 
show a bias toward threat compared to nonanxious controls, as indicated by faster 
reaction times to dots replaced by threatening versus non-threatening material (MacLeod, 
Mathews, & Tata, 1986; Mathews, 1990; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985). Work using a 
lexical decision making task, in which participants are presented with individual letters 
and asked whether the letters form a word, also support the finding of a bias toward threat 
in those with GAD (MacLeod & Mathews, 1991; Mogg, Mathews, Eysenck, & May, 
1991) Results from studies using the Stroop task, in which threat and neutral words are 
presented in different colors and subjects are asked to name the colors while ignoring 
content, found that those with GAD are slower than nonanxious controls to name threat 
words (Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Mogg, Mathews, & Weinman, 1989). Attentional 
interference is thought to occur due to word content, resulting in errors and longer 
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response times. This work is not unequivocal, however, as at least one study failed to find 
differences in attentional bias associated with GAD (Dibartolo, Brown, & Barlow, 1997). 
Individuals with GAD are also more likely than nonanxious individuals to 
interpret ambiguous stimuli as threatening. When presented with ambiguous scenarios, 
GAD participants described more threatening interpretations and rated the events as more 
likely to occur compared to nonanxious individuals (Butler & Mathews, 1983). A later 
study found similar results using homophones, with GAD participants reporting more 
threatening meanings (e.g., die rather than dye) than nonanxious participants (Mathews, 
Richards, & Eysenck, 1989). 
2.6. Integrated models 
Several cognitive variables have been studied in relation to worry, and the 
importance of avoidance, intolerance of uncertainty, beliefs about worry, and information 
processing in the process of worry in adults has been established. However, most models 
to date have focused on the association of only one ofthese variables with worry. The 
few studies that have incorporated multiple variables have increased our understanding of 
how these variables influence one another and their relative contributions to worry. 
It is likely that the cognitive variables associated with worry are also related to 
one another. In particular, information processing, intolerance of uncertainty and problem 
orientation seem very closely related. Given that uncertainty is both distressing and 
interpreted as threatening, problem orientation and information processing are almost 
certainly also affected. A negative problem orientation might also lead to difficulty 
defining problems in concrete or specific terms, increasing the perception of ambiguity in 
everyday life. This could in tum present difficulty for individuals likely to interpret threat 
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from ambiguous stimuli and for those with a high level of intolerance of uncertainty. 
Dugas and colleagues (1997) were the first to examine the relations between 
intolerance of uncertainty and negative problem orientation in a sample of GAD patients. 
A hierarchical regression showed that the constructs made both unique and shared 
contributions to the prediction of worry. These results suggest that, although the two are 
highly related to one another, they also have individual associations with worry. Dugas et 
al. (2005) also investigated how intolerance of uncertainty affects information processing. 
When presented with neutral and uncertain words, undergraduate students high in 
intolerance of uncertainty recalled a greater proportion of words associated with 
uncertainty. A second study of undergraduates showed that individuals high in 
intolerance of uncertainty were more likely to interpret ambiguous information as 
threatening. Further, intolerance of uncertainty predicted threat interpretation above and 
beyond age, gender, anxiety, depression, and worry. 
Given the importance of intolerance of uncertainty to worry, Dugas et al. 
proposed that intolerance of uncertainty is the central feature of worry (Dugas, Gagnon, 
Ladouceur, & Freeston, 1998). The model suggests that beliefs about worry, problem 
orientation, problem solving skills, and cognitive avoidance are also important to 
consider. Discriminant analyses found that all variables except problem solving skills 
contributed to the correct classification of GAD and nonanxious participants and 
intolerance of uncertainty played the strongest role in the classification. A second 
discriminant analysis approach comparing the utility of the cognitive variables to GAD 
symptoms in group classification found that cognitive variables correctly classified 
almost as many participants as the symptom measures (82% and 91 % respectively). 
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Cognitive variables also appear to be associated with clinical severity. A study of 
intolerance of uncertainty and beliefs about worry found that each factor varied according 
to symptom severity (Ladouceur et aI., 1998). Results showed that both nonclinical 
subjects meeting GAD symptom criteria by questionnaire and GAD patients reported 
higher intolerance of uncertainty and more dysfunctional beliefs about the usefulness of 
worry compared to moderate worriers. Work by Ruscio and Borkovec (2004) examined 
several differences between high worriers with and without a GAD diagnosis. The groups 
showed several similarities, with both groups demonstrating difficulties with 
concentration, high levels of positive beliefs about worry, and an increased awareness of 
thoughts. However, negative beliefs about worry appeared to be unique to high worriers 
with GAD, and GAD worriers experienced more negative intrusions after a worry 
induction task. A later study by Dugas and colleagues showed that several cognitive 
variables were related to GAD severity in a clinical sample (Dugas et aI., 2007). 
Intolerance of uncertainty and negative problem orientation correlated with three 
measures of GAD severity, cognitive avoidance correlated with two measures of GAD 
severity, and positive beliefs correlated with one measure of GAD severity. Moderate and 
severe GAD groups also reported higher intolerance of uncertainty and negative problem 
orientation compared to the mild GAD group. Overall, results of these studies are 
consistent, suggesting that intolerance of uncertainty is the most robust predictor of GAD 
severity. 
2.7 Discussion 
Several conceptual models of worry in adults have been proposed. Some 
emphasize the importance of the avoidant functions of worry, while others highlight the 
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importance of beliefs about worry and metacognition. Others have investigated the roles 
of intolerance of uncertainty, problem orientation, and information processing. Some 
studies have examined these factors alone while others have looked at interrelationships 
between them and their relative contributions to worry. Given that each conceptual model 
reviewed has empirical support, the time has come to incorporate these constructs and 
ideas into a more comprehensive model. Dugas' group has taken importantsteps toward 
this endeavor (Dugas et aI., 1997; Dugas et aI., 1998), including several cognitive 
variables in their designs to determine unique and shared contributions of the variables to 
worry. 
There is still some conceptual confusion in understanding differences in various 
types of worry. Studies to date have investigated nonclinical worry, excessive but not 
clinical worry, worry in disorders other than GAD, and worry in GAD, but it is still not 
clear how these presentations of worry differ from one another in terms of the cognitive 
variables discussed. Understanding how worry differs in these groups has important 
implications for conceptualization and treatment. Identifying variables unique to clinical 
worry can inform our understanding of distress and interference associated and provide 
better targets for intervention. 
3. Worry in children 
3.1 GAD diagnostic criteria 
The GAD diagnosis in children is still somewhat controversial in the literature 
today. This is due in part to its somewhat recent addition to the DSM-IV-TR (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2004), replacing the previous diagnosis of Overanxious Disorder 
(OAD). The current diagnosis requires excessive worry about a number of events, more 
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days than not for a period longer than six months. Children must also report that the 
worry is uncontrollable and list one or more somatic complaints, such as restlessness, 
fatigue, difficulty concentrating, irritability, muscle tension, or sleep disturbance. 
Studies investigating the reliability, validity, and factor structure of the present 
GAD diagnosis in children have found mixed results. Two studies have documented 
discrepancies in parent and child report of child symptoms (Kendall & Pimental, 2003; 
Tracey, Chorpita, Douban, & Barlow, 1997). Parent-child agreement was low for all 
symptoms and, for one-fourth of the children diagnosed with GAD, either parent or child 
reported no clinical worry at all (Tracey et aI., 1997). The physical symptoms criterion 
(Criterion C) is especially problematic, and Tracey et aI., (1997) found that parent-child 
agreement improved when this requirement was ignored. The muscle tension item in 
particular shows low clinical utility. Muscle tension was endorsed less frequently than 
any other symptom in Criterion C by both parents and children, in contrast to the high 
level of endorsement by adults with GAD (Tracey et aI., 1997). Later work confirmed the 
problems with Criterion C, with parents and children failing to agree on symptoms 48-
66% of the time (Kendall & Pimentel, 2003). Parents also reported significantly more 
physical symptoms than children. A recent factor analysis found that GAD symptoms in 
children factored into a worry factor and a somatic distress factor, and the somatic 
distress factor correlated similarly with social anxiety, major depressive disorder, and 
worry (Higa-McMillan, Smith, Chorpita, & Hayashi, 2008), casting additional doubt on 
the utility of somatic symptoms for diagnosing GAD in children. 
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3.2 Content of worry 
Within the literature on childhood worry, issues related to worry content have 
been examined most frequently. In community samples of children ages 7 to 13 years, the 
most common worries include health (e.g., other people's health, operations, receiving 
medical care, bodily symptoms, contracting AIDS, or getting sick), school (e.g., tests and 
grades, being called on, and interacting with the teacher) personal harm (e.g., injury from 
other people and being attacked), and social contact (e.g., being teased and getting 
friends) (Muris et aI., 2000; Silverman, La Greca, & Wasserstein, 1995). Work with 
clinic referred and community based samples of children ages 6 to 16 years showed 
similar worries across groups, including concerns about health, school, disasters, and 
personal harm (Weems, Silverman, & La Greca, 2000). Comparisons of children 
diagnosed with GAD/OAD and specific phobia showed that the two groups reported only 
slight differences, with GAD children endorsing more worry about the future and social 
concerns while children with specific phobia reported more worry related to health of 
others and family (Weems, Silverman, & La Greca, 2000). Results also suggest that 
intensity of worry, not content, discriminates the worry of clinical children from that of 
community children, and GAD/OAD children from specific phobia children. 
3.3 Developmental considerations 
3.3.1 Cognitive development implications for worry 
Although both the cognitive development and child anxiety literatures are well 
developed, works bridging the two are uncommon. Mapping emerging cognitive abilities 
onto the expression of anxiety related symptoms would greatly improve our 
understanding of the underlying processes involved in worry in children, shed light on 
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symptom expression, and potentially explain developmental trends in anxiety prevalence 
and content. Such an understanding could also inform intervention strategies, ensuring 
that cognitive techniques to alleviate worry are applicable given the child's level of 
cognitive development. For example, techniques used effectively with adults, such as 
monitoring anxious thoughts, may not be appropriate for young children who lack 
awareness of their thoughts. Two related issues are relevant to children's cognitive 
development and worry, and both will be explored. First, the question of how child 
development influences the prevalence, expression, and experience of worry will be 
addressed, and second, the implications of cognitive development for adult models of 
worry and GAD will be discussed. 
The prevalence of worry and GAD symptoms in children increases with age, 
suggesting that the development of cognitive skills facilitates worry. In a study of 
symptoms in clinically referred children ages 5 to 11 years and adolescents ages 12 to 19 
years, results showed older children were more likely to present with six or more 
symptoms compared to younger children (66% and 35%), and more older children met all 
seven OAD diagnostic criteria than younger children (28% and 4%) (Strauss, Lease, Last, 
& Francis, 1988). One longitudinal study of community adolescents found that from 
early adolescence (average age of 12 years) to middle adolescence (average age of 16.6 
years), GAD symptoms increased for girls and decreased for boys (Hale, Raaijmakers, 
Muris, van Hoof, & Meeus, 2008). Another study examined developmental changes in 
fears, nightmares, and worry in a group of school children (Muris, Merckelbach, Gadet, 
& Moulaert, 2000). Fears and nightmares were common in the youngest children ages 4 
to 6 and increased in children ages 7 to 9. Fears and nightmares were least common in the 
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10 to 12-year-olds. Worry, however, was more common in the two older groups (47% 
compared to nearly 80%). Westenberg and colleagues have shown associations between 
psychosocial development and separation anxiety and OAD. Psychosocial development 
was defined as ego development consisting of three related facets of impulse control, 
interpersonal style, and conscious preoccupations. The authors show that psychosocial 
development was a stronger predictor than child age in correctly classifying children into 
separation anxiety disorder and OAD diagnostic groups (Westenberg, Siebelink, 
Warmenhoven, & Treffers, 1999). 
In addition to changes in worry prevalence with age, there is also evidence for 
developmental patterns associated with worry content. One study found that in younger 
children aged 3 to 6 years, the most frequent worry involved fear of imaginary creatures, 
a very uncommon concern in older children ages 7 to 14 years (Muris et aI., 2002). Older 
children in this study worried more about school performance, a fear that increased 
steadily with child age. Other studies with children ages 5 to 12 years have found similar 
developmental patterns, with younger children describing more concern over threats to 
physical safety, which declines with age, and older children describing worries about 
behavioral competence, interpersonal and social issues, and psychological well-being, 
which generally increases with age (Muris et aI., 2002; Vasey, Crnic, & Carter, 1994). 
However, results have not been entirely consistent. For example, in the previously 
discussed study, Vasey et aI. (1994) failed to find increased worry about behavior 
competence in the 11 to 12-year-old children compared to 8t09-year-olds. In another 
study of a community sample of children ages 7 to 12 years, Silverman, La Greca, and 
Wasserstein (1995) found only that younger children experienced more intense worry 
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about disasters than older children. Other evidence for developmental trends in worry 
comes from a study of the nature of worry across child age. In a non-referred group of 
children ages 8 to 13 years, older children's worry was characterized by more problem 
solving and less rumination compared to younger children (Szabo & Lovibond, 2004). 
One way to understand these developmental trends might be to identify precisely 
what skills and abilities are necessary to worry and to then relate these abilities to typical 
cognitive development. A focus on the most widely accepted definition of worry 
proposed by Borkovec (1994) provides a useful guide. Borkovec suggests that worry is a 
future oriented, primarily verbal stream of negatively valenced and threatening thoughts 
that are relatively uncontrollable. Several skills and abilities are required to engage in 
such a process. As Vasey (1993) points out, individuals must be able to conceptualize the 
future, elaborate on threatening thoughts, and possess language abilities adequate to 
represent threatening information. Also implied by this definition is an awareness of 
one's internal stream of consciousness and the experience that the thoughts are out of 
one's control. 
Borkovec's (1994) definition implies that worry requires a fairly advanced 
conceptualization of the future. Vasey (1993) suggests that very young children's 
restricted ability to think about the future limits their ability to worry in a generalized 
way. For example, Povinelli, Landau, and Perilloux (1996) concluded that children 
younger than age four are unable to view themselves as an entity moving through time 
and cannot integrate past, present, and future versions of the self. Vasey (1993) proposes 
that even a vague notion of the near future, like that seen in children as young as 2 years 
old (Littenberg, Tulkin, & Kagan, 1971), may be sufficient for worry. However, the 
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increase in ability to understand the future seen in children around age 8 years (Wallace 
& Rabin, 1960) likely results in an ability to experience truly generalized worry. 
Children's increasing ability to extend their understanding of the future further in time 
may provide more opportunities to consider potentially threatening situations, while 
younger children's narrow temporal understanding limits the possibility of threat (Vasey, 
1993). 
Worry also requires the production of a chain of negative thoughts depicting 
various threatening outcomes. Vasey (1993) has summarized work indicating that 
children's abilities to generate and reason about possible outcomes increases with child 
age. The cognitive literature also suggests that although young children have a basic 
ability to reason about causal events and consider alternative outcomes, this ability 
increases with age. For example, Flavell, Green, and Flavell (2004) reviewed work 
indicating that children as young as age three years can infer causal relationships in 
complicated conditions, and counterfactual reasoning, which involves making predictions 
about what could have happened but didn't, has been documented in children as young as 
three years (Harris, German, & Mills, 1996). Another important point related to worry 
was raised by German (1999), who suggested that counterfactual reasoning is more likely 
to occur in response to negative events than positive ones, so that children imagine what 
other possible courses of action could have prevented the undesirable outcome. 
Reflecting on past events and imagining how things might have gone under different 
circumstances suggests an ability to generate and understand the possibility of multiple 
outcomes, which may then lead to a consideration of future possible negative events. For 
example, in the study discussed above, (Harris et aI., 1996) children were presented with 
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a story about Carol who wore muddy shoes in the house and got the floor dirty. When 
asked what would have happened if Carol had taken her shoes off, most children 
correctly responded that the floor would have remained clean. An ability to ask past 
"what ifs?" might also indicate an ability to generate future "what ifs?" If children were 
to reason similarly in their own lives, a reflection such as "If I remembered to take off my 
shoes last time I wouldn't have gotten in trouble" could lead to a reflections such as 
"What if I forget to take off my shoes next time?" In fact, others have argued that 
reasoning about future hypothetical situations may actually be easier than past 
hypothetical situations because children do not have to mentally "undo" actions or 
imagine contrary to their reality (Robinson, Beck, Mitchell, & Riggs, 2000). Other work 
(Lagattuta, 2007) suggests that young children draw from past experiences to explain or 
predict hypothetical future emotions and behavior. When discussing the future in 
response to vignettes, most 4-year-old children and all 5 and 6-year-old children were 
able to make at least one "definite past to future" connection, indicating that the future is 
definite. Further, 63% of 4-year-olds and 75% of 6-year-olds made at least one 
"hypothetical past to future" connection, suggesting that the future is hypothetical. 
Adult models of worry presuppose an awareness of internal verbal thoughts. 
However, cognitive work suggests that children's awareness of their internal stream of 
consciousness and that of others varies as a function of cognitive development. For 
example, when asked if a person sitting in a chair and waiting was having thoughts, most 
3 and 4-year-old children responded that the person was having no thoughts or ideas 
(15% and 35%, respectively) while 80% of 6 and 7 -year-olds reported that the waiting 
individual was in fact having thoughts (Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1993). Another study 
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showed that young children are not aware that others must be having thoughts when 
doing mental activities, such as reading or talking (Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1995). 
Flavell, Green, and Flavell (2000) found that at age 5 years children were able to report 
previous thoughts when instructed to imagine themselves doing something they enjoy; 
however, when instructed to have "no thoughts" children could not report their 
spontaneous ideation, denying having any thoughts at all during this time. Relatedly, 
Flavell, Green, Flavell, and Grossman (1997) found that 4 and 5-year-old children were 
significantly worse than adults at detecting inner speech, leading the authors conclude 
that preschool children have very little awareness of covert verbal thought. They suggest 
that this ability may develop in the early school years when children begin practicing 
inner speech in academic tasks, such as reading and writing. 
Current definitions of worry also suggest that clinical worry is uncontrollable. 
However, children's awareness that thoughts are not entirely under their power may still 
be emerging in early childhood. Flavell, Green, and Flavell (1998) found that young 
children had little understanding that the mind's activity is somewhat uncontrollable. 
When presented with stories depicting children attempting to avoid specific thoughts 
(thoughts of an injection or the cause of a loud noise), 5-year-old children were more 
likely than older children (9 and 13-year-olds) or adults to report that children in the 
stories could control their thoughts and successfully avoid thinking about the injection or 
the loud noise. Surprisingly, more than half of the 9-year-old sample also incorrectly 
indicated (for at least one story) that children in the story could control their thoughts. 
Five-year-old children were also more likely than the two older groups to report that it is 
possible to avoid having any thoughts at all for three consecutive days. Finally, only half 
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of 5-year-olds reported experiencing unwanted thoughts compared to 95% of the 9-year-
olds. Overall, results suggest that most development in metacognition occurs between the 
ages of 5 and 9 years, although 9-year-olds still lag behind 13-year-olds. These findings 
have important implications for the current diagnostic criteria for GAD in children which 
require that the worry is experienced as uncontrollable. The abilities of children younger 
than 9 years to determine the controllability of their thoughts may still be developing, 
preventing accurate report of worry controllability and possibly preventing a GAD 
diagnosis that may otherwise be appropriate. 
Another related cognitive ability in children relates to children's use of mental 
representation of information, which may affec:t the expression or experience of worry. 
Borkovec's (1994) definition describes worry as primarily verbal stream of negative 
thoughts, and so the ability to capture meaning verbally is crucial for worry. Whether 
young children with less developed verbal skills worry in the way that Borkovec 
describes is not known. Vasey (1993) has described work indicating that young children 
rely on visual images and motor schemes in understanding and storing information about 
the world, and Szabo (2007) found that while adults' worries were closely related to the 
extent to which they think about their worries, children's worries were related more 
strongly to fear than to a verbal thinking process. Perhaps children's limited language 
skills protect them from adult-like worry or, alternatively, they may worry in a more 
simplistic way, using the verbal skills available at any given point in time. 
Current definitions of worry also suggest that worry serves an avoidant function. 
Children's cognitive and language development may directly influence the extent to 
which worry results in avoidance of more distressing material. Borkovec (1994) has 
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suggested that it is worry's primarily verbal nature that allows for emotional avoidance, 
and such avoidance is thought to be a powerful maintaining factor in the worry process. It 
is not currently understood if children's worry is associated with a perception of 
avoidance or the autonomic inflexibility seen in worried adults. 
Finally, metacognitive models of worry imply a number of cognitive abilities that 
vary with cognitive development. . Several models rest on an individual's ability to form 
relatively complex thoughts and judgments about both internal and external stimuli. The 
metacognitive model, if applied to children, assumes that children have the ability to 
reflect on their own worry and form opinions about its usefulness and threat to wellbeing. 
Models including intolerance of uncertainty assume the ability to recognize a situation as 
uncertain and evaluate its potential for threat, as well as the capacity to develop a set of 
negative beliefs about uncertainty. Problem orientation, described as metacognitive 
activity that characterizes an individual's approach to dealing with problems, also implies 
abilities to recognize and evaluate mental problem solving skills and outcomes. Work 
reviewed previously (Flavell et aI., 1993; 1995; 2000) indicates that children may be 
unaware of or have difficulty identifying their own thoughts, suggesting that 
metacognitive models may have limited utility in young children (especially those 
younger than school age). With increasing cognitive abilities and metacognition capacity, 
these models are likely to become more accurate in explaining children's experience of 
worry. More work is needed in this area to fully understand the cognitive abilities 
underlying the worry process and at what age or developmental stage we would expect 
cognitive models to apply to children. 
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3.3.2 Empirical studies of cognitive development and worry 
Few empirical studies have examined relations between cognitive development 
and worry, but results are generally consistent and show the predicted increase in worry 
with age and/or development. Vasey, Crnic, and Carter (1994) examined relations 
between cognitive development, self-concept complexity, and worry in a community 
sample of children ages 5 to 12 years. In response to a series of vignettes depicting 
worried children, older children (8 to 12 years) described more worries, a greater variety 
of worries, and longer worry elaboration chains than those of the 5 to 6- year- old 
children. The authors note that children as young as 5 years reported worries and were 
able to elaborate on them, although not to the extent of the older children. Results also 
showed positive correlations between self-concept complexity and proportion of physical 
threat and social evaluation/psychological worries. Muris et al. (2002) found similar 
results in their study of a community sample of children ages 3 to 14 years old. Personal 
worry and vignette worry elaboration scores correlated positively with child age and 
cognitive development, as measured by Piagetian conservation tasks. Interestingly, even 
the youngest group of children (ages 3 to 6 years) reported a significant amount of worry. 
Worry elaboration also mediated the association between age/cognitive development and 
personal worry. Another study comparing cognitive development (measured with one 
conservation task) and worry across samples of children with average and below average 
intelligence found that average children reported more worry and fear compared to 
children with below average intelligence, but there were no differences in worry content 
or severity (Muris, Merckelbach, & Luijten, 2002). For average children, passing the 
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conservation task was associated with an increased likelihood of worry, but no such 
relation was found for the children with below average intelligence. 
3.3.3 Discussion 
Considering children's cognitive capacity and the influence of emerging skills on 
the experience of worry is important for the development of testable models of worry in 
children. Generally, as Vasey (1993) concludes, young children seem to possess basic 
forms of the abilities needed for some form of worry, including a notion of the future, an 
ability to generate at least one negative outcome, and the ability to produce counterfactual 
"what if' statements. Perhaps these basic abilities are adequate for some form of worry, 
albeit different from that experienced by adults, but they are likely unable to experience 
generalized worry due to the still developing ability to recognize internal streams of 
consciousness or to recognize that their thoughts are at times uncontrollable or 
spontaneous. As these skills develop, however, children's basic worry may elaborate as 
they are able to consider a greater number of negative events extending more distantly 
into the future. Metacognitive awareness of internal verbal thoughts and their 
uncontrollable nature also allows children to interpret meaning from their internal 
experience. If children find the worried, uncontrollable thoughts threatening, this may 
lead to a type of meta worry as described by Wells (1999). Future work measuring 
relevant cognitive abilities, worry, and worry related variables (such as beliefs about 
worry and intolerance of uncertainty) will help to identify weaknesses or inaccuracies in 
applying current adult models of worry to children. Such work would also be beneficial 
in determining at what age or cognitive ability adult models become applicable to 
children. This in tum could be used to guide future treatment interventions. 
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4. A model of worry in children 
The adult worry literature is far more advanced than the child literature. Because 
so little is known about worry in children, these adult models provide a basis for 
suggesting hypotheses that can then be tested. The model proposed here integrates 
several models of worry supported in the adult literature and also accounts for the 
influence of parenting, an important factor in the development of childhood anxiety. 
Before describing the model, several issues must be addressed. First, because of the lack 
of literature on childhood GAD and worry, many elements of the model are speculative at 
this point. The adult literature indicates that the elements are important for worry in 
adults; therefore, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that they also operate in children. 
Second, how the worry process unfolds is still unknown. No adult studies have 
investigated whether processing of information occurs first, followed by the activation of 
beliefs about worry or an attempt to problem solve. It is unclear how these processes 
occur, whether sequentially or in concert. The proposed model hypothesizes only that 
some variables are more likely linked with the onset of worry while others serve as 
maintaining factors. 
The model begins with a potentially ambiguous trigger (Mathews (1990) has 
suggested that many everyday cues for danger are ambiguous), and details the 
contributions of the process variables of ( a) intolerance of uncertainty, (b) information 
processing, (c) problem orientation, and (d) beliefs about worry (See Figure 1). First, the 
model suggests that intolerance of uncertainty, information processing and problem 
orientation are closely interrelated and predictive of worry. Previous work indicates that 
those high in intolerance of uncertainty find ambiguous situations distressing and have 
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difficulty functioning in them (Buhr & Dugas, 2006). Ambiguity is also associated with 
information processing patterns characterized by attentional bias toward threat and 
elevated threat interpretation, suggesting that intolerance of uncertainty may be related to 
the threatening meanings interpreted from ambiguity. When confronted with an 
ambiguous, threatening stimulus, it follows then that problem orientation suffers. 
Individuals may feel overwhelmed or less confident when presented with ambiguous 
information, hindering effective problem solving. Worry may provide the illusion of 
problem solving but without any decision making or plan of action (Borkovec, 1985). 
The fourth process variable in the model is beliefs about worry, both positive and 
negative. Positive beliefs such as "worrying helps me cope" and "worry prevents bad 
things from happening" may make worry an attractive coping strategy for handling 
threat. Both positive and negative beliefs about worry have been linked with worry and 
trait anxiety (Davey, Tallis, & Capuzzo, 1996). Negative beliefs that worry is harmful or 
dangerous may contribute to increased worry by leading to attempts to monitor, control, 
or suppress worry. These strategies, however, are likely increase rather than decrease 
intrusive worries. Whether negative beliefs are best conceptualized as a factor associated 
with the onset of worry or one more closely linked with the maintenance of worry over 
time remains an empirical question. Before teasing apart more specific relations, 
however, it should first be determined if there is in fact an association between negative 
beliefs and worry in children. 
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Figure 1. Hypothesized conceptual model of relevant process and maintenance variables 
in childhood worry. 
The model also illustrates how worry is maintained by positive and negative 
beliefs and cognitive avoidance. First, worry reinforces positive beliefs about worry 
because of the perception that worry helps to avoid threat. Borkovec (1994) suggests that 
worriers believe worry (1) helps them to avoid potential danger by prompting a change in 
behavior, (2) preparing them to cope with potential future danger, and (3) reinforcing 
irrational beliefs that worry reduces the likelihood of danger. For instance, a person who 
thinks "I shouldn't drive after dark because 1 might get in an accident" is prompted to 
avoid driving after dark because she believes it is dangerous. This change in behavior is 
reinforced because the person believes that worry helped to avoid a potentially dangerous 
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situation. Beliefs about coping are reinforced because the worrier expects that, should a 
catastrophe occur, she will be more prepared than she would have if she hadn't worried 
beforehand. A worrier's superstitious belief that worrying prevents feared events is 
negatively reinforced by its non-occurrence. Secondly, negative beliefs about worry 
(including metaworry) maintain the process by increasing the likelihood of future 
worries. Beliefs that worry is dangerous or should be controlled will result in increased 
metacognitive awareness, prompting additional attempts to suppress or control worry. 
Paradoxically, such suppression attempts are likely to be associated with an increase in 
subsequent intrusive worries. Third, worry is maintained because it serves an avoidant 
function. Worry is conceptualized as a form of cognitive avoidance due to the primarily 
verbal nature of worry and reduction in fear provoking imagery (Borkovec & Lyonfields, 
1993) as well as reduced processing of more emotional content (Borkovec & Inz, 1990; 
Borkovec & Roemer, 1995). This has been associated in tum with decreases in 
physiological responses, suggesting that worry results in avoidance of uncomfortable 
physiological symptoms as well (Borkovec & Hu, 1990). 
Finally, the potentially causal influence of parenting on the process and 
maintenance of worry is hypothesized. Parents are expected to influence their children's 
beliefs about worry, both positive and negative. Further, it is predicted that parents will 
influence their children's approach to making sense of ambiguous information by 
impacting the child's problem orientation, intolerance of uncertainty, and information 
processing. 
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s. Support for hypothesized model 
Support for the hypothesized model is reviewed in three parts. First, support for 
the model detailing the process and maintenance of worry in children will be reviewed. 
Second, evidence for the direct association between parenting and worry will be 
reviewed, followed by evidence for specific links between parenting and process and 
maintenance variables. 
5.1 Process and maintenance variables in childhood worry 
Work detailing associations between cognitive variables and worry in children is 
lacking. The largest body of work in this domain has linked child worry/GAD with biases 
in information processing. Few studies have examined other potential cognitive variables, 
such as intolerance of uncertainty, positive beliefs about worry, negative problem 
orientation, and cognitive avoidance in adolescents or children. Work on the avoidant 
function of worry in children is also lacking and children's physiological response to 
worry is unknown. Although the literature is small, the few studies available will be 
discussed here. In this section, work on information processing and GAD/worry will be 
reviewed, followed by a discussion of the few studies of cognitive variables in 
adolescents and children. 
5.1.1. Information processing, 
Children with GAD display similar information processing styles to those found 
in adults with GAD. These children tend to over estimate the likelihood of threatening 
situations, show biased attention toward threat, and interpret ambiguity as threatening. 
One study comparing children ages 9 to 18 years diagnosed with OAD, depression, and 
nonclinical controls found that anxious participants reported that both future social and 
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physical threat were more likely to occur (Dalgleish et aI., 1997). Interestingly, anxious 
children rated threats as more likely to happen to others than themselves. Higher threat 
interpretation in anxious children ages 8 to 17 years was also supported using a 
homograph task (Taghavi, Moradi, Neshat-Doost, Yule, & Dalgleish, 2000). When 
presented with homographs, children diagnosed with GAD were more likely to choose a 
threatening meaning compared to non-anxious controls. Another study examined both 
threat interpretation and estimates of likelihood of threat in a nonclinical sample of 
children (mean age= 10.71 years) (Suarez & Bell-Dolan, 2001). Children were 
categorized as high worriers or non-worriers and presented with threatening and 
ambiguous vignettes. Worried children provided higher threat ratings for both types of 
vignettes and rated future negative events as much more likely than non-worriers. 
Childhood GAD has also been associated with attentional biases. When GAD, 
mixed anxious-depressed, and nonclinical children (ages 9 to 18 years) viewed threat and 
depression related stimuli, the GAD group showed bias toward threat-related, but not 
depression-related, material. (Taghavi,Neshat-Doost, Moradi, Yule, & Dalgleish, 1999). 
The mixed anxiety-depression group failed to show bias toward either material type. 
Taghavi et al. (2003) also found support for attentional bias in GAD children ages using 
the modified Stroop task (mean ages = 13.47 for the GAD group, mean age=14.50 for the 
control group). When participants were instructed to name the color of happy, neutral, 
threat or depression related words, GAD children showed significant interference, such 
that naming the color of the negative (combined threat-related and depression-related) 
words required more time than neutral words. This effect was not found for nonanxious 
children. A similar pattern of attentional bias was found when emotional face stimuli 
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were used as probes. Comparing children with GAD to nonanxious controls (ages 7 to 12 
years) showed that only children with severe GAD, as measured by clinician severity 
ratings, displayed a bias toward both angry and happy faces (Waters, Mogg, Bradley, & 
Pine, 2008). Children with lower anxiety severity did not differ statistically from the 
control group, who showed no attentional bias. These results may be somewhat 
confounded, however, as more than half of the children in the GAD group also met 
criteria for social anxiety disorder. 
Children with GAD also show higher threat interpretations of ambiguous 
situations. An initial sample of children ages 7 to 12 years was administered measures of 
GAD, separation anxiety, and social anxiety symptoms (Bogels, Snieder, & Kindt, 2003). 
Children who scored in the top and bottom 10% of each measure were then presented 
with nine ambiguous stories and asked to give interpretations and action plans. Results 
showed that anxious children described more negative interpretations compared to the 
control children. There was no difference, however, in coping plans. Further, children 
with GAD showed no specific dysfunctional interpretations compared to the other 
anxiety groups. 
In an attempt to determine profiles associated with specific disorders Dalgleish et 
al. (2003) compared children with major depressive disorder, GAD, and post-traumatic 
stress disorder on multiple information processing variables, including memory, 
attention, and prospective cognition (mean child age for the groups ranged from 12.83 
years to 15.58 years). Results showed that anxious children showed a bias toward 
threatening but not depression-related material, an effect driven by the GAD children, as 
the PTSD group showed no bias. GAD and PTSD groups did not differ in their estimation 
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of likelihood of threatening events, either for self or others. Anxious and depressed 
groups did not differ on the memory task. 
5.1.2 Intolerance of Uncertainty 
Work on intolerance of uncertainty has just recently begun with children, likely 
due to the fact that reliable and valid measures were not available. Comer et ai. (2009) 
recently modified a measure of intolerance of uncertainty for use with children ages 7 to 
17 years. Their results found support for the measure and its relation with worry, 
indicating that intolerance of uncertainty correlated positively with worry and showed 
adequate utility in distinguishing clinically anxious from community samples. There were 
no age or sex effects for the anxious sample, although interestingly intolerance of 
uncertainty decreased with child age in the community group. These initial findings 
suggest that intolerance of uncertainty may also be relevant for childhood worry, 
although much work is yet to be done in this area. 
5.1.3 Beliefs About Worry 
Studies of metacognition in children are just beginning to emerge. One group 
examining anxious and nonanxious children ages 8 to 13 years found that 30% of 
nonanxious children reported that their worry had some positive features compared to 
GAD/OAD children who reported no positive (Muris et aI., 1998). Another study of 
adolescents aged 13 to 17 years found support for a five factor model of metacognition, 
including (1) positive beliefs, (2) uncontrollability and danger, (3) cognitive confidence, 
(4) superstition-punishment-responsibility, and (5) cognitive self-consciousness 
(Cartwright-Hatton et aI., 2004). Each factor showed significant correlations with 
measures of anxiety, depression, and obsessions. Although no measure of worry was 
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included in the study design, results indicate that adolescents experience a range of 
metacognition similar to adults. Bacow et al. (Bacow, Pincus, Ehrenreich, & Brody, 
2009) adapted a similar questionnaire for use with children ages 7 to 17 years. Results 
supported the hypothesized four factor structure including positive metaworry, negative 
metaworry, superstitious, punishment and responsibility beliefs, and cognitive 
monitoring. Each of the four subscales correlated positively with worry, even after 
controlling for worry content, and the cognitive monitoring subscale discriminated 
clinical from nonclinical children (with nonclinical children reporting higher levels of 
cognitive awareness). Child age and cognitive monitoring also correlated positively. 
Finally, a sex and age interaction was found, with adolescent girls scoring higher on the 
total score compared to adolescent boys. There were no sex differences for younger 
children. 
In a recent review, Ellis and Hudson (2010) discuss the applicability of the 
metacognitive model of worry to child populations. Their review of the literature 
suggests partial support for the downward extension of metacognitive adult models to 
adolescents and children. They found that positive beliefs about worry were normal in 
children and adolescents with high and low levels of worry and mixed support for the 
association of worry and negative beliefs. The authors also found mixed results for the 
hypothesis that age is associated with changes in metacognitive development. The 
authors note that the use of different measures assessing worry and metacognition likely 
playa role in the contradictory findings to date. 
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5.1.4 Integrated Models 
Integrated models, incorporating several the previously discussed cognitive 
variables, have tested the applicability of conceptual adult models to adolescent samples. 
One group examined associations of intolerance of uncertainty, positive beliefs about 
worry, negative problem orientation, and thought suppression in a sample of adolescents 
(Laugesen et aI., 2003). Results showed that, after controlling for physical symptoms and 
gender, beliefs about worry, problem orientation, and intolerance of uncertainty 
significantly predicted worry scores. Thought suppression, however, did not contribute to 
the prediction. The study also used a discriminant analysis to predict membership of 
moderate or high worry groups, revealing that only intolerance of uncertainty and 
problem orientation contributed to the classification, while beliefs about worry and 
thought suppression did not. A later study by Gosselin and others (2007) examined 
associations between beliefs about worry, cognitive avoidance, and worry in a sample of 
high school students, ages 12 to 19 years. Participants were divided into high (>80th 
percentile) and moderate (40th _60th percentile) worry groups based on worry scores. After 
controlling for age and gender, high worriers endorsed stronger beliefs about worry, 
including that worry helps to solve problems and worry helps to avoid the worst. When 
predicting worry scores, the belief that worry helps to avoid the worst explained 
additional variance beyond age and gender, while the belief that worry helps to solve 
problems did not. Further, the high worry group reported using more avoidance strategies 
than the moderate worry group on all five avoidance domains, including avoidance of 
triggers, thought substitution, distraction, thought suppression, and transformation of 
images. The largest effect sizes were found for avoidance of triggers and thought 
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substitution. When predicting worry scores, all avoidance strategies expect 
"transformation of images" contributed to the regression equation. 
5.1.5 Other process and maintenance variables 
Two other studies have examined children's attempts to cope with their worry 
(Muris, Meesters, Merckelbach, Sermon, & Zwakhalen, 1998; Szabo & Lovibond, 2004). 
Both studies used an interview approach to gather information about children's worry. 
One study showed that children ages 8 to 13 years used distraction strategies (thinking 
about other things and engaging in some other activity) and seeking social support most 
frequently in their attempts to resists or control their worry (Muris et aI., 1998). Children 
who met criteria for GAD/OAD attempted to distract themselves from their worries less 
frequently than nonclinical children (Muris et aI., 1998). In another study, children ages 8 
to 13 years reported using distraction most frequently to end their worry, followed by 
decision making (decided how to cope with stressor), and seeking social support (Szabo 
& Lovibond, 2004). Anxious and nonanxious groups did not differ in worry control 
strategies. Children in both clinic referred and non-referred groups reported that their 
worry consisted primarily of anticipation of future negative events (63% and 53% of 
worry, respectively). For the clinic referred group the second greatest percentage of 
worry consisted of rumination (17%) while the non-referred group reported problem 
solving (30%) (Szabo & Lovibond, 2004). 
5.1.3 Discussion 
Overall, work examining potential process and maintenance variables in 
childhood worry is lacking. Of all the potentially relevant variables, information 
processing has received the most attention. Generally, the data support the notion that 
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children with GAD process information differently from nonanxious children; however, 
additional evidence is needed to support the hypothesis that children process information 
differently from children with other anxiety disorders. In addition to information 
processing, there is a growing literature examining metacognition and intolerance of 
uncertainty in adolescents and children. Recent work (Cartwright-Hatton et aI., 2004; 
Gosselin et aI., 2007; Laugesen et aI., 2003) in adolescent samples supports the 
importance of meta cognition, beliefs about worry, problem orientation, intolerance of 
uncertainty and cognitive avoidance in worry. The recent validation of two measures, the 
MCQ-C (Bacow et aI., 2009) and the rusc (Comer et aI., 2009), with children as young 
as age seven years provides new opportunities to study these variables in relation to 
worry. Preliminary findings suggest that intolerance of uncertainty and metacognition in 
children is similar to that in adults and is associated with anxiety and/or worry. Overall, 
however, these data are limited by a lack of comparison to other anxiety disorders as a 
control group. Whether these cognitive variables are unique to GAD and/or worry 
remains untested. Only one known study to date (Dalgleish et aI., 2003) compared 
children diagnosed with GAD to children diagnosed with other anxiety diagnoses. It may 
be that cognitive processes function similarly across all anxiety disorders or across levels 
of worry severity; however, more work is needed before such conclusions are drawn. 
5.2 Parenting and childhood worry 
As previously discussed, several recent reviews have examined the links between 
parenting behaviors and childhood anxiety (Bagels & Brechman-Toussaint, 2006; 
McLeod et aI., 2007; van der Bruggen et aI., 2008; Wood et aI., 2003). Particularly 
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relevant to the current discussion are several studies that have attempted to isolate 
specific parenting behaviors associated child GAD or worry. 
5.2.1 Perceived parenting and self-report worry 
Consistent with findings that parenting is associated childhood anxiety generally, 
studies of perceived parenting also show relations with worry specifically. Most work has 
used the EMBU-C (Egna Minnen Betraffende Uppfostran, My memories of upbringing: 
Perris, 1980), a retrospective self-report measure of perceived parenting, to measure 
parental behavior. One study of a community sample of children 9 to 13 years found that 
self-report worry scores correlated positively with both maternal and paternal anxious 
rearing and rejection, and maternal rejection (Muris, Meesters, Merckelbach, & 
Hiilsenbeck, 2000). Another study using the same measure with an older sample of 
children ages 13 to 16 years found significant positive correlations between worry and 
anxious rearing and overprotection of both parents for girls, but only overprotection of 
both parents for boys (Muris, Merckelbach, Meesters, & van den Brand, 2002). Findings 
of these two studies were partially replicated with a clinic referred anxious sample of 
children ages 7 to 18 years (8 with a diagnosis of GAD), with significant positive 
correlations between parental rejection and worry, but not anxious rearing, 
overprotection, or warmth (Brown & Whiteside, 2008). Analysis of associations between 
parenting factors and worry for the GAD sample alone were not conducted. 
5.2.2 Perceived parenting and self-report GAD symptoms 
Parenting has also been linked with measures of GAD clinical symptoms in 
children. Results from a self-report study of primary school children ages 8 to 12 years 
showed that parental anxious rearing, mother's control, and father's emotional warmth 
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each correlated with GAD symptoms (Muris & Merckelback, 1998). Interestingly, this 
same pattern of results was also found for separation anxiety symptoms, but not for other 
anxiety disorders. Another study of nonc1inical adolescents ages 12 to 19 years (Hale, 
Engels, & Meeus, 2006) found significant correlations between perceived parental 
alienation, rejection, and control with GAD symptoms, although only alienation and 
rejection made unique contributions to symptom prediction. A follow-up multi-group 
structural equation model of the relative contributions of parental alienation and rejection 
to GAD symptoms showed differences based on child gender and age (younger and 
older). Analyses showed that perceived parental alienation was significantly related to 
GAD in all four groups whereas rejection was related to all groups except the older male 
sample. 
5.2.3 Self-report attachment and worry 
Others studies have used measures of attachment to examine relations between 
parenting and worry. Two studies have shown that insecure attachment is associated with 
higher levels of worry in children ages 7 to 18 years (Brown & Whiteside, 2008) and 9 to 
13 years (Muris et aI., 2000), with no differences between ambivalent and avoidant 
attachment styles. A stepwise regression examining contributions of parenting and 
attachment status found that only parental rejection and insecure attachment explained 
significant variance in worry scores (Brown & Whiteside, 2008). A study with 
undergraduate students found that those who met criteria for GAD based on self-report 
questionnaires indicated less secure attachment than their normal counterparts (Eng & 
Heimberg, 2006). Cassidy and colleagues (1994) conducted two studies to further 
examine differences in attachment associated with GAD. In the first study a sample of 
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undergraduate students who met criteria for GAD using a self-report form reported higher 
levels of rejection and role reversaVenmeshment (defined as the need to protect and fear 
of losing a primary care giver) compared to those who reported no symptoms of GAD. 
Students who reported GAD symptoms were also more likely to describe feelings of 
anger and vulnerability toward their mother. In a second study, these researchers 
examined clinically diagnosed adult GAD subjects and non anxious controls. Results 
partially supported the previous study, with GAD subjects reporting more role reversal 
and enmeshment, as well as feelings of anger and vulnerability toward their mothers 
(Cassidyet aI., 1994). 
5.2.4 Discussion 
Results from the previously reviewed work suggest an association between 
parenting and worry/GAD in children, although methods and measures have been 
inconsistent. One limitation of the literature is the reliance on self-report. No study to 
date has used parent report or direct observation of parenting to examine relations with 
child worry. Because children in these samples report high levels of worry or symptoms 
of GAD, perceptions of their parents may be skewed by anxious cognitions or 
interpretive biases. A lack of other clinical comparison groups also limits these findings. 
Without comparison groups of children with depression or other anxiety disorders, 
conclusions cannot be made about the uniqueness of the association between these 
parenting behaviors and worry. The cross-sectional designs of these studies also limit the 
directionality of our conclusions. It appears that parenting is related to worry and 
symptoms of GAD, but precisely how the two are related remains speculative. Although 
it is tempting to suggest that role reversal or enmeshed parent-child relationships cause 
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children to worry, the current data do not support this hypothesis. An alternative 
hypothesis could be that worried children elicit certain types of parenting behaviors from 
their caregivers. Future longitudinal work could address these methodological concerns. 
5.3 Relations between parenting and worry related variables 
Although associations between parenting and childhood anxiety are generally 
well supported, links between parenting and specific worry related cognitive variables 
have not been well studied. The next section examines potential parental influences on 
children's cognition, specifically those cognitive variables hypothesized to relate to 
childhood anxiety and/or worry. The association between parenting and child information 
processing has received the most attention, although there are several studies examining 
associations between parenting and child beliefs about worry and intolerance of 
uncertainty. 
5.3.1 Parent influence on information processing 
The impact of parenting on information processing in children in the context of 
GAD or worry has received limited attention. However, there is a small literature 
demonstrating significant relations between parent and child information processing in 
children with anxiety disorders broadly. Generally, these studies suggest that children's 
interpretations of situations are associated with their parent's interpretation, although the 
mechanisms for this are unclear. No studies to date have examined worry or GAD 
specifically, and so work with children with anxiety disorders broadly will be reviewed. 
Several studies have supported the hypothesis that parents influence children's 
threat interpretations. A common method for testing this association examines parental 
and child responses to ambiguous situations. One study compared anxious and 
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nonanxious mothers and their children, ages 7 to 15 years, on their responses to 
ambiguous situations (Cresswell, Schniering, & Rapee, 2005). Results showed that 
mothers of anxious children had higher threat interpretation scores and mother's threat 
interpretation scores correlated positively with their child's. Another study extended this 
work by including a clinical control group. Researchers compared interpretations of 
mothers and children, ages 7 to 12 years, with an anxiety disorder, externalizing disorder, 
and healthy controls (Gifford, Reynolds, Bell, & Wilson, 2008). Participants were 
presented with homographs and homophones and prompted to interpret the stimuli. 
Results showed that anxious children made more threatening interpretations than non-
clinical children but not externalizing children. Mothers of anxious children did not make 
more threatening interpretations than other mothers, and contrary to Cresswell et al. 's 
(2005) findings, mother and child interpretations were not correlated. However, mother's 
interpretation bias was associated with child's anxiety and child's interpretation was 
associated with mother's anxiety. Although results did not support a direct association 
between mother and child threat interpretations, the correlation between maternal anxiety 
and child threat interpretation suggests an influence that warrants additional attention. 
Other work has looked more explicitly at the mechanism by which parents 
influence their children. These studies have primarily used a procedure in which children 
are first asked to interpret ambiguous situations alone, followed by a family discussion 
task, to examine parental influences on children's responses. Barrett, Rapee, Dadds, and 
Ryan (1996) examined mothers and children, ages 7 to 14 years, who were diagnosed 
with an anxiety disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, or no disorder. Anxious and 
oppositional children were more likely than nonclinical children to interpret ambiguous 
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scenarios as threatening and anxious children were more likely than both comparison 
groups to choose avoidant coping plans. When parents were asked to predict their child's 
response, parents of anxious children responded similarly to their anxious children, 
making a higher number of threat interpretations and predicting avoidant responses by 
their children. After a discussion with their parents, anxious children increased their 
avoidant responses, while nonclinical children decreased avoidance responses. These data 
suggest that parents playa role in their children's responses by reinforcing threatening 
interpretations and modeling avoidant behavior by providing reassurance and sheltering 
their children from potentially anxiety provoking situations. The authors called this the 
Family Enhancement of Avoidant Responses effect, or the FEAR effect. Similar work by 
Chorpita, Albano, and Barlow (1996) hypothesized that parental verbalization contributes 
to the development of threat interpretations in children. They suggest that parental 
discussion of threat or danger primes children for future threat interpretation. Four 
anxious families and eight non-clinical families, with children ages 9 to 13 years, were 
presented with four ambiguous situations. Children first responded individually and then 
discussed the scenarios with their parents. Results showed that anxious expression by 
parents was related to changes in the child's interpretations and plans, although only the 
correlation for fathers was significant. The small sample size of this study and low power 
limit its generalizability, although the preliminary results are compelling. 
These results have not been replicated consistently, however. Other studies have 
failed to demonstrate this effect (Logsdon-Conradsen, 1998, as cited in Shortt et aI., 
2001; Shortt et aI., 2001). Results from one study with children ages 6 to 14 years suggest 
that the demands of the task, specifically whether or not the discussion would determine 
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treatment eligibility for the child, influenced the FEAR effect (Shortt et aI.., 2001). Their 
results indicated that families in the treatment irrelevant group were more likely to 
change to avoidant plans after a family discussion. Results also showed that maternal 
distress was associated with the FEAR effect. 
Other work has examined the impact of parents on children's interpretations of 
ambiguity in terms of emotional reasoning and social referencing. Emotional reasoning is 
defined as drawing conclusions about the environment based on emotional states ( e. g., 
"I'm anxious so there must be something to be fearful of') and social referencing refers 
to forming judgments about a stimulus based on the perceived reactions of others. 
(Morren, Muris, &Kindt, 2004). Children, ages 7 to 13 years, were first administered a 
self-report spider phobia questionnaire as a measure of anxiety and then read four stories 
describing situations of social, separation, generalized, or parent anxiety. Each story had 
four versions including objective/subjective danger information and positive/anxiety 
response information, so that each combination of danger and response information was 
presented. Results showed that children's interpretations of danger relied on both 
objective information as well as anxiety related signals from parents. Children rated the 
parent anxiety story containing parental anxiety response information (e.g., "It frightens 
your mum and her legs start to tremble" p. 8) as more dangerous than the parent anxiety 
story with positive response information (e.g., "Your mum looks happy and she smiles 
and waves to her friend in the car" p. 8). Interestingly, child anxiety was not a significant 
predictor of child response to the parent anxiety story. Also of note was a significant 
anxiety by age interaction for the parent anxiety story. In children with high trait anxiety, 
the parent-based reasoning effect decreased, while this effect increased in children with 
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low trait anxiety. Although replication of this research is needed, this methodology 
contributes to the growing body ofliterature on parental influences on children's 
cognitive biases. 
Other work has used the Stroop task to examine associations between parenting 
and child information processing. Moradi et al. (1999) examined the processing of threat 
related and neutral words in children of parents with posttraumatic stress disorder and 
control parents. Children were not diagnosed with any psychiatric disorder and groups 
did not differ in anxiety level. Children, ages 9 to 17 years, were presented with words of 
happy, neutral, depression-related, threat-related, and trauma-related content. A 
significant interaction of word type and group indicated that children of parents with 
PTSD were slower to name threat-related words compared to neutral words. In contrast, 
children of normal controls were faster to name depression-related words compared to 
neutral words. 
5.3.2 Parent influence on beliefs 
A number of theoretical models hypothesize that the behavior of anxious parents 
promotes the development of dysfunctional cognitions in their children, increasing their 
risk for anxiety disorders (Chorpita & Barlow, 1998; Vasey & Dadds, 2001). However, 
few empirical studies have examined these hypotheses. In terms of the proposed model, 
the influence of parenting on children's metacognition about worry is of particular 
interest. Only one study to date (Gallagher & Cartwright-Hatton, 2008) has examined the 
influence of parental behaviors on children's beliefs about anxiety. A community sample 
of adolescents, aged 16 to 18 years, completed measures of perceived parenting, anxiety, 
cognitive errors, metacognition about worry, and thought control. Results showed 
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correlations between metacognition and overreactive parenting, defined as punitive, 
harsh, or inconsistent discipline. Overreactive parenting also predicted trait anxiety, and 
metacognition partially mediated the association. Finally, children of overreactive parents 
reported more dysfunctional positive and negative beliefs about worry. Although not 
specific to clinical worry, a recent study of parents and children (mean age of 16 years) 
with Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder suggests that parents have some influence on their 
children's metabeliefs (Jacobi, Calamari, & Woodard, 2006). Cognitive models ofOCD 
share some similarities with models of GAD in that thoughts are monitored, evaluated, 
and followed with suppression or control attempts. In a study of parental influences on 
child metabeliefs, adolescents and their parents completed self-report measures of 
anxiety, obsessional beliefs, and cognitive self-consciousness. Results showed small but 
significant correlations between parent and child report on subscales of the obsessional 
beliefs, including over-responsibility, threat estimation, and thought importance/control 
of thoughts. However, it should be noted that most parent and child variables showed no 
relation. 
5.3.3 Parent influence on intolerance of uncertainty 
The role of parenting in children's intolerance of uncertainty has yet to be fully 
explored. Only one known study has examined the influence of parenting on children's 
ability to cope with uncertainty. Zlomke and Young (2009) tested a meditational model 
proposing that children's intolerance of uncertainty mediates the relation between 
perceived parenting style and anxiety, depression, and worry. Results from a community 
sample of older adolescents and young adults (ages 18 to 23 years) showed that 
intolerance of uncertainty mediated the association of perceived anxious rearing with 
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worry and anxiety, but not depression. Although promising, this work is limited by its 
self-report nature. Future work with younger adolescents and school aged children, in 
addition to observational or other report measures of parenting, will be necessary to 
determine if these effects can be replicated and if they generalize to younger samples. 
5.3.4 Discussion 
Children rely on their parents for information about the world, which shapes their 
behavioral and cognitive approaches to internal and external stimuli. When parents 
display anxiety in response to a situation, children likely learn that there is something to 
fear. Parenting has also been hypothesized to influence child cognitions and 
metacognition. The previous section provides support for the idea that parenting is 
associated with worry in children, although how the two are linked remains unclear. 
There is some support for the association between parenting/parental beliefs and 
children's metacognition and intolerance of uncertainty, however, replication of these 
results is needed, as well as studies including younger children and clinical populations. 
Associations between parenting and worry related cognitive variables, such as problem 
orientation and cognitive avoidance, have yet to be examined. Given the importance of 
these variables to adult models of worry, this represents an area of potential growth for 
the future. The first step is to establish if such cognitive variables are in fact important in 
understanding worry in children. If this is indeed the case, work should then move 
forward to identify how parental factors influence these variables. Understanding how 
parents reinforce or model thoughts and behaviors, both positive and negative, could also 
inform the model and potentially provide targets for intervention. Future work should 
also consider the impact of parent and child sex when examining the influence of 
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parenting. At least two studies have reported that the relations between perceived 
parenting and worry depends on the sex of the parent or the child (Muris, Meesters, 
Merckelbach, & Hiilsenbeck, 2000; Muris, Merckelbach, Meesters, & van den Brand, 
2002). Continuing to investigate how mother's and father's influences differ from one 
another and how each parent impacts sons and daughters differently will be important. 
6. The current study 
This review has summarized literature outlining theoretical models of clinical 
worry in adults and the role of parenting in childhood anxiety generally. These literatures 
were integrated and a conceptual model specific to the process and maintenance of 
clinical worry in children proposed. Literature supporting the hypothesized model was 
then reviewed. Although there is preliminary support for some relations proposed in the 
model, many remain speculative and rely, in the absence of information about childhood 
worry, on the adult worry literature. 
The next step is to begin a systematic testing of the hypothesized associations 
while also examining the role of cognitive development and the potential effects of child 
sex. At each step of model testing, the relations between variables should account for the 
potential impact of the child's cognitive development. Ideally this would be done using a 
longitudinal design, although testing the applicability of the model using a cross-sectional 
design would be a more feasible first step toward justifying the increased costs associated 
with a long term longitudinal study. It will be especially important to test this model with 
children around the ages of 7 and 8 as it is most likely that the cognitive abilities 
emerging at this developmental stage allow for generalized worry (Vasey, 1994). 
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As the proposed theoretical model is large, it seems logical to distinguish three 
separate parts of the model, each building upon the previous. At the heart of the model 
are the process variables associated with child worry, hypothesized to be most closely 
involved in childhood worry based on work with adults and adolescents. Specifically, this 
includes testing associations between worry and the cognitive variables of beliefs about 
worry, intolerance of uncertainty, information processing factors, and problem 
orientation. Having established a central model, the role of maintaining factors, including 
negative beliefs about worry, suppression attempts, cognitive avoidance, and autonomic 
inflexibility can then be considered. Finally, the influence of specific parenting behaviors, 
parental modeling, and impact of parent sex on process and maintenance factors can be 
considered. 
This study represents the first step in this model testing process and will examine 
relations between four cognitve variables and worry, while also examining effects related 
to cognitive development and sex (see Figure 2). Four cognitive variables of intolerance 
of uncertainty, beliefs about worry, negative problem orientation, and threat 
interpretation were included in this study, as well as two self-report measures of worry 
and two measures of cognitive development in addition to child age. Using two measures 
of worry allows for the replication of results and decreases the likelihood that effects may 












Figure 2. Hypothesized relations between cognitive variables, worry, and cognitive 
development. 
Several related hypotheses will be tested. First, general measures of association 
between variables will be examined. It is hypothesized that cognitive development will 
correlate positively with cognitive variables and with worry and that cognitive variables 
will correlate positively with measures of worry. Next, the effect of cognitive 
development on the three cognitive variables will be examined. Specifically, it is 
hypothesized that cognitive development will predict scores on measures of beliefs about 
worry, intolerance of uncertainty, threat interpretation, and negative problem orientation, 
and that cognitive development will moderate this association. Relations between 
cognitive variables and worry will then be examined. Specifically, it is hypothesized that 
beliefs about worry, intolerance of uncertainty, threat interpretation, and negative 
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problem orientation will predict child worry and that cognitive development measures 
will moderate the association, such that the strength of the predictor variables increases 
with advanced development. To examine the effect of child sex, male and female 
children will be compared on the cognitive measures and measures of worry. It is 
expected that female children will report higher scores than male children on measures of 
beliefs about worry, intolerance of uncertainty, threat interpretation, negative problem 
orientation, and worry. Finally, it is hypothesized that the cognitive variables of beliefs 
about worry, intolerance of uncertainty, threat interpretation, and negative problem 




This study was reviewed and approved by the University of Louisville's Internal 
Review Board (Approval #09.0612 ). Participants were recruited in two ways. First, local 
elementary schools were invited to participate. Three Catholic and one public school 
agreed to send home study materials with children in grades two through five. 
Participants were also recruited through flyers placed throughout the community. Efforts 
were made to include equal proportions of male and female children and children across 
the age range. Recruitment attempts were also directed toward including ethnic minority 
groups proportional to the ethnic composition of the Louisville metro area. 
The required sample size was calculated a priori using G* Power 3.1, (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). To detect a large effect size (.40) with a power of 
.80, a sample size of 34 is necessary for a correlation analysis. In order to detect a large 
effect size (.35) with power of .80 in a regression model with a total of 10 predictors, a 
sample of 54 is required. To detect a large effect size (.80) with power of .80 with at-test, 
a sample of 46 is necessary. Thus, a total of 54 children were required for this study. 
Procedure 
Study participation included completing self-report forms at home and a short 
telephone interview with the researcher or a research assistant at a date and time selected 
by the participant and his or her parent(s). Children recruited through schools were sent 
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home with an infonnationalletter, parental consent and child assent fonns, and study 
self-report fonns. Parents also received a fonn explaining the purpose and content of the 
telephone interview. Children completed self-report fonns at home and returned 
completed packets to their classroom. Children were required to return both parental 
consent and child assent along with their completed packets to be included in the sample. 
Packets were collected from the classroom two weeks following the distribution date. 
A total of 661 packets were sent home and 74 returned, for a response rate of 
approximately 11.2%. Children recruited through flyers (n=6) were screened briefly and 
packets delivered to their home and picked up by researchers. Telephone interviews took 
place several days to one month following the time of measure completion, based on 
dates selected by participants and availability during selected times. Interviews lasted 
approximately 15 minutes. All participating children were entered into a drawing for I of 
4 $25 gift cards to Borders bookstore for their participation. 
Participants 
Participants were 80 children between the ages of 8 and 12 years. Seventy-one 
percent of the sample was female (n = 57). The average age was 9.6 years (SD = 1.10). 
More than half of the children were 9 or 10 years old (8-year-olds n=12, 9-year-olds 
n=21, 10-year-olds n=22, ll-year-olds n=12, and 12-year-olds n=3, and 10 children did 
not indicate age). Ethnic composition of the sample was primarily European American 
(74%), 6% Hispanic/Latino, 3% Asian, 4% Other, and I % African American, and 12% 
declined to answer. 
A total of80 participants returned completed self-report measures. Twenty-four 
participants had missing interview data due to missing contact infonnation (n=8) or were 
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unavailable when contact attempts were made (n=16). For those who were not available 
at initial contact, several phone calls were made at various times of day over a three week 
period. After leaving three voice messages, no further attempts were made to contact 
children. 
Measures 
Please see Appendix A for copies of all measures. 
Children's Opinions of Everyday Life Events (COELE; Suarez & Bell-Dolan, 
2001). The COELE is an interview developed to measure children's interpretations of 
ambiguous situations. Six ambiguous and six threatening vignettes are described, based 
on previous work identifying areas of concern for children. Following the vignettes, 
children are first asked what they think happened in each situation and responses are 
coded as threat (1) or non-threat (0). Children then use a 5-point Likert type scale (1 = not 
at all, 5 = extremely) to rate how worried, sad, and angry they would feel if this happened 
to them, how threatening they find the situation, and how likely they think it is to occur. 
The measure yields total scores for spontaneous threat interpretation, worry, sadness, and 
anger ratings, threat rating, and likelihood rating. Test-retest reliability estimates for the 
measure range from .52 (threat ratings for the ambiguous situations) to .77 (for the 
likelihood ratings), and internal consistency scores range for .80 to .86. In the current 
study, children were administered the COELE over the telephone in a session lasting 
approximately 15 minutes. In order to reduce administration time, three ambiguous and 
three threatening vignettes were chosen (each reflecting a family, social, and school 
theme) and children did not rate anger. Children's spontaneous threat ratings for both 
ambiguous and threatening vignettes were calculated separately and summed for a total 
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threat interpretation score. The six interpretations were coded by a second rater, a 
doctoral student in clinical psychology, for half of the participants. Inter-rater agreement 
was very good, kappa=.86. 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire-Child Version (PSWQ-C; Chorpita et aI., 
1997). The PSWQ-C is a 14 item measure designed to assess worry in children ages 6 to 
18 years. Children rate each item on a scale from 0 (never true) to 3 (always true), with 
higher scores indicating greater worry severity. Exploratory factor analysis revealed a 
one-factor solution for the measure. The measure has adequate psychometric properties, 
including good internal consistency, discriminant validity, and convergent validity with 
the worry/oversensitivity scale of the Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale 
(Chorpita et aI., 1997). The measure also showed test-retest reliability of .92 (Chorpita et 
aI., 1997). 
Revised Child's Manifest Anxiety Scale (RCMAS; Reynolds & Richmond, 
1978). The RCMAS is a 37 item self report measure designed to measure several 
components of anxiety in children and adolescents. Items are readable at a third grade 
level and the measure has been shown to be reliable and valid for children in grades 1 to 
12. Children indicate a yes/no response to each item. The RCMAS has three factors, 
including physiological anxiety, worry/oversensitivity, and social concerns. For this study 
only worry/oversensitivity scores were used in order to provide an additional measure of 
worry. Reliability and validity estimates have been shown to be good to excellent (Gerard 
& Reynolds, 2004) and internal consistency is good (Reynolds & Paget, 1983).For this 
study, raw subscale scores were converted to age adjusted T -scores, based on published 
norms (Reynolds & Paget, 1983). 
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The Metacognitions Questionnaire for Children (MCQ; Bacow et aI., 2009). 
The MCQ is a 24 item self-report questionnaire for children ages 7 to 17 years, adapted 
from the Metacognitions Questionnaire for Adolescents (Cartwright-Hatton, Mather, 
Illingworth, Harrington, & Wells, 2004). The measure is comprised of four factors, 
including positive metaworry, negative metaworry, 
superstition/punishment/responsibility beliefs, and cognitive monitoring. Children 
indicate their agreement to the items using a 4-point scale (1 = do not agree, 2 = agree 
slightly, 3 = agree moderately, 4 = agree very much). The MCQ-C has a Flesch-Kincaid 
reading grade level of 2.0, indicating that the measure is appropriate for children reading 
at a second grade level. Initial evaluations indicate good internal consistency (alpha = .87 
for nonclinical and alpha = .89 for clinical samples), concurrent validity with measures of 
worry (subscales range from r = .21 to .48), and criterion validity, with the clinical 
sample scoring significantly higher than the nonclinical sample (Bacow et aI., 2009). 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale for Children_(IUSC; Comer, Roy, Furr, 
Gotimer, Beidas, Dugas, & Kendall, 2009). The IUSC is a 27 item self-report measure 
for children 7 to 17 years of age. The child measure is based on the Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Scale for adults (Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Freeston et aI., 1994) and assesses 
children's tendency toward negative reactions to uncertain situations and events. Children 
are asked to indicate their agreement with the items using a 5-point scale (1 = not at all, 3 
= somewhat, and 5 = very much). A preliminary study suggests that the measure has 
strong psychometric properties, including internal consistency (alpha = .92) and 
convergent validity (correlations with anxiety and worry, r =.71 and r = .75, 
respectively). 
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Social Problem Solving Inventory-Revised-Child Adaptation (SPSI;D'Zurilla 
& Nezu, 1990). The SPSI-R is a 52 item self report measure assessing approaches to 
solving problems in adults. The measure consists of five factors, including positive 
problem orientation, negative problem orientation, rational problem solving, 
impulsivity/carelessness style, and avoidance style. Currently, no measures of problem 
orientation are available for use with children. For the current study, the Negative 
Orientation (10 items) subscale was adapted for children ages 7 to 12 years. Items were 
reworded to be appropriate at a third grade reading level (as measured by the Flesch-
Kincaid reading level), while maintaining meaning. Preliminary item changes were 
reviewed and modified with three doctoral students in clinical psychology and the lab 
director of the Healthy Parents-Healthy Kids Research lab. 
Cognitive Development. Three variables were used to estimate cognitive 
development. Child age was used as the primary measure, along with two cognitive 
abilities hypothesized to relate specifically with the ability to worry, including awareness 
of thoughts and the ability to generate multiple possible outcomes. 
Child age. Child age has frequently been used by other researchers to study 
cognitive development in relation to the ability to understand or perform certain tasks 
(Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1993; 1995; 1998; 2000; 2004). Child age has also been used 
to examine trends in worry content and prevalence (Muris, Merckelbach, Gadet, & 
Moulaert, 2000; Vasey, Crnic, & Carter, 1994). 
Awareness of thoughts. The ability to recognize internal streams of thought is 
inherent in the current definition of worry, and therefore it is expected to have some 
relation with worry. Indeed, Bacow et al. (2009) showed that cognitive monitoring 
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increased with child age, suggesting that this is a cognitive ability that increases with age. 
For this study, awareness of internal thoughts was assessed using the cognitive 
monitoring subscale of the MCQC. 
Interpretation total. Vasey (1993) suggests that children's ability to generate and 
reason about possible outcomes may influence their ability to worry. To measure this 
ability, an additional question was asked following the COELE interview, modified from 
the catastrophizing interview used previously with children by Vaesy et al. (1994). In 
Vasey et al.' s approach, children were presented with vignettes of worried children and 
asked to elaborate on the worries by responding to prompts of "Why would that bother 
him/her?" or "Why would that be bad?" Because catastrophizing interviews in the first 
person have been associated with considerable anxiety in adults (Vasey & Borkovec, 
1992), the approach was modified to reduce the possibility that children would 
experience distress during the telephone interview. In this study, children were again read 
the first vignette from the COELE and instructed to generate as many possible 
explanations for the situation as they could. Children were prompted with "Try to think 
of another explanation" until they could no longer generate any additional responses. 
This generated two measures, including a total interpretations variable consisting of the 




Preliminary Examination of Measures 
The final sample included 56 children with complete data. An additional 14 
children had self-report data but no interview data (n=70), and an additional 10 
participants had self-report data but did not provide demographic or contact information 
for the interview (n=80). To increase power, efforts were made to include as much data 
as possible for each analysis. 
Of the 80 completed self-report packets, there were 28 missing items (of a total 
of 80 participants x 98 items per packet = 7840 items), or less than 1 % of the total items. 
No participant had more than one missing data point. Missing items were replaced with 
the series mean. 
Descriptive statistics. Each measure will be briefly discussed in terms of 
published norms. Means and standard deviations are presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1. 







Worry/Oversensitivity T* 56.90 (4.73) 
Worry/Oversensitivity Raw 5.98(3.05) 
Cognitive Measures 
IUSC-C 66.49 (20.69) 
Problem-Negative 16.91 (1.21) 
MCQ-Positive 8.83 (3.07) 
MCQ-Negative 13.63 (4.64) 
Cognitive Development 
MCQ-CSC 14.99 (4.48) 
All Possible Interpretationsl\ 5.44 (4.12) 
Clinical Nonclinical 
7.1 (5.8) 
23.84 (9.3) 11.79 (5.9) 
54.9 (1.9) 
4.04 (2.84) 
64.97 (21.7) 52.81 (18.) 
8.91 (3.96) 10.15 (2.91) 
13.55 (4.27) 12.50 (4.11) 
14.53 (4.32) 16.45 (4.02) 
Note. Worry/oversensitivity n=70; I\All Possible Interpretations n=56; . data not available 
Overall, the sample reported higher than expected levels of worry, intolerance of 
uncertainty, and metacognition. The average adjusted Penn State Worry Questionnaire-
Child score for this sample was much higher than that of another community sample 
(Muris et aI., 2001), and falls in the 86th percentile based on community norms (Muris et 
aI., 2001). Standard Penn State Worry Questionnaire-Child scores were also elevated 
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compared to previous published norms for community samples (Comer et aI., 2009). 
Scores on the worry/oversensitivity subscale also suggest that the sample is highly 
worried. The average T score for the current sample was comparable to that of a sample 
of children with anxiety disorders (Mattison, Bagnato, & Brubaker, 1988). Further, 41 % 
of the sample scored above 60, a cut score considered "pathological" and used to 
discriminate clinical from nonclinical children (Mattison, Bagnato, & Brubaker, 1988). 
The sample also strongly endorsed intolerance of uncertainty and metacognitive 
variables. This group reported higher than expected levels of intolerance of uncertainty 
compared to a community sample mean reported in the rusc validation study and was 
again closer to that of a sample of children with anxiety disorders than those from a 
community sample (Comer et aI., 2009). Scores on measures of beliefs about worry were 
also high, and compared to the means reported in the MCQ-C validation study, the 
current sample scores more closely resembles scores from children with anxiety disorders 
than those from a community sample (Bacow et aI., 2009). 
Preliminary psychometrics of the negative problem orientation scale of the Social 
Problem Solving Inventory-Child adapted measure were examined by assessing internal 
consistency and convergent validity. Chronbach's coefficient alpha of .86 suggested 
adequate internal consistency and item-total correlations, using Pearson product-moment 
correlation, ranged from .27 to .82. Only one item failed to correlate at an acceptable 
level (Item 22, "When I can't fix a problem on my first try, I get sad and give up" r = .27, 
p = .02, based on criteria used by Chorpita et aI., 1997 for adapting the Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire for children), but the correlation was significant so the item was included. 
These statistics were also examined for younger (8-9) and older (10-12) children 
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separately. Results mirrored those when groups were combined. The measure showed 
adequate internal consistency for both groups, with alpha = .77 for younger children and 
alpha = .90 for older children. Item 1 failed to correlate significantly with the total score 
for the younger group, but all other items correlated significantly, ranging from .49 to 
.74. In the older group Item 22 failed to correlate significantly with the total score. 
Correlations for other items ranged from .60 to .89. The measure appeared to have strong 
convergent validity, as evidenced by expected associations with other related variables. 
Negative problem orientation correlated positively with the Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire-Child, r = .52,p<.001, worry/oversensitivity, r = .54,p<.001, and 
intolerance of uncertainty, r = .76, p<.OO 1. 
Preliminary psychometrics of the shortened COELE were also examined. Means, 
standard deviations, and alphas are presented in Table 2. Spontaneous threat 
interpretation scores were calculated for the ambiguous and threatening situations 
separately by summing responses across each of the three stories (totals ranged from 0 to 
3). Mean worry, sad, threat, and likelihood ratings were also calculated by averaging 
across the three stories of each type. Total possible interpretation score is also presented. 
Generally, internal consistency measures failed to meet acceptable standards (> .70, 
Nunnally, 1978). When scores were collapsed across threat and ambiguous scenarios, 
internal consistency improved somewhat, so that threat rating achieved an acceptable 
level. Threat interpretation and worry rating still failed to meet standards of acceptability. 
Due to these problems, worry and threat interpretation total score were not used in any 
subsequent analyses. In place of threat interpretation total, average threat rating across 
ambiguous and threat scenarios was used as a measure of threat interpretation for future 
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analyses. Validity was assessed by examining correlations with worry measures. See 
Table 3. Threat interpretation did not correlate with either measure of worry, contrary to 
results from Saurez and Bell-Dolan (2001). Worry, threat, and likelihood ratings 
correlated positively with both measures of worry. 
Table 2. 
Descriptive Statistics for COELE Variables. 
Total Sample Females Males 
n=43 n = 13 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Alphas 
Threat Interpretation .49 
Ambiguous Scenario 1.64 (.97) 1.72 (.88) 1.38 (.77) .32 
Threat Scenario 2.75 (.51) 2.72 (.55) 2.85 (.38) .21 
Average Threat Rating .75 
Ambiguous Scenario 2.90 (.76) 2.96 (.79) 2.72 (.80) .44 
Threat Scenario 3.07 (.92) 3.08 (.88) 3.03 (1.06) .72 
Average Worry Rating .69 
Ambiguous Scenario 3.17 (.76) 3.18 (.79) 3.12 (.70) .46 
Threat Scenario 3.42 (.78) 3.46 (.76) 3.31 (.88) .62 
Average Likelihood Rating .70 
Ambiguous Scenario 2.41 (.70) 2.43 (.76) 2.33 (.49) .36 
Threat Scenario 2.29 (.80) 2.34 (.82) 2.13 (.73) .62 
All Possible Interpretations 5.44 (4.12) 6.00 (4.52) 3.62 (1.19) 
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Table 3. 
Correlations between COELE Variables and Worry Scores. 
PSWQ-C 
Threat Interpretation .01 
Avg Threat Rating .41 ** 
Avg Worry Rating .39** 
A vg Likelihood Rating .30* 
All Possible Interpretations -.11 
*p<.05, **p<.OI 







Normality of the variables was assessed by a visual inspection of a histogram as 
well as examination of skewness and kurtosis z scores, where scores greater than 2.58 are 
significant at the p <.01 level, the suggested cut point for small samples sizes (Field, 
2005). Positive beliefs about worry showed significant positive skew based on the 
histogram, and z score values for positive beliefs about worry and all possible 
interpretations indicated significant skewness and/or kurtosis, so log transformations 
were conducted. These transformations improved the distribution of both variables to 
roughly normal. Transformed variables were used in future analyses. 
Sample Characteristics 
Because not all children had complete data sets, differences between the three 
groups (complete, missing interviews, and missing interviews and demographics) were 
examined. ANOV As for Penn State Worry Questionnaire-Child and 
worry/oversensitivity scores were nonsignificant, suggesting that data are missing at 
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random and that failure to complete the interview or provide demographic data was not 
related to worry severity. 
Demographic and study variables were also examined across recruitment site to 
examine possible sampling differences (schools and flyer). There was a significant 
difference in child age, F( 4, 65) = 3.2 7, p =. 02,partial1]2 = .17, power = .81, and 
Levene's test was significant, F (4,65) = 2.79,p = .03, so Dunnett's T3 was used for 
pairwise comparisons. Pairwise comparisons showed that children from one of the 
Catholic schools (M = 9.13, SD = .64) were significantly younger than children recruited 
with flyers (M= 10.63, SD = 1.30),p = .02. Groups did not differ on Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire-Child scores, but there was a difference on worry/oversensitivity scores, F 
(4, 75) = 5.34,p = .001, partial 1]2 = .22, observed power = .96. Children recruited by 
flyer (M = 3.62, SD = 3.20) were significantly less worried than children from the public 
school (M= 7.35, SD = 2.85),p = .02, and one of the local Catholic schools (M=7.06, 
SD = 2.62). Groups did not differ on any of the other cognitive variables. To control for 
sampling differences, recruitment site was used as a covariate in all future analyses. 
Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis One: Correlations between variables. 
A. Cognitive development will correlate positively with cognitive variables and 
with worry. Partial correlations, controlling for recruitment site, were examined. 
Correlations are presented in Table 4. Before examining associations between cognitive 
development and the other variables, it should be noted that cognitive development 
measures were not correlated with one another. Child age did not correlate significantly 
with cognitive monitoring or all possible interpretations. All possible interpretations also 
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failed to correlate with cognitive monitoring. Because the all possible interpretations 
variable did not appear to be an indicator of cognitive development and was not 
associated with worry, it was not included in any future analyses. 
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Table 4. 
Partial Correlations Between Study Variables, Controllingfor Recruitment Site. 






IUSC .51 ** .59** 
n 80 70 
NP .53** .49** .75** 
n 80 70 80 
PB .14 .03 .32** .29** 
n 80 70 80 80 
NB .53** .47** .65** .60** .12 
n 80 70 80 80 80 
Thrt .24 .25 .29* .39** .15 .38** 
Rtg 
n 56 56 56 56 56 56 
Age -.25* -.17 .05 -.18 .05 -.06 -.11 
n 70 70 70 70 70 70 56 
Monitor .39** .30* .51 ** .43** .15 .55** .40** -.17 
n 80 70 80 80 80 80 56 70 
All Int -.04 -.12 .14 .05 .10 .14 .09 -.02 .15 
n 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 
Note. W/O = worry/oversensitivity subscale, NP = negative problem orientation, PB = 
positive beliefs about worry, NB = negative beliefs about worry, Thrt Int = threat 
interpretation, All Int = all possible interpretations 
*p<.05, **p<.OI 
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The hypothesis that cognitive development measures would correlate positively 
with cognitive variables was partially supported. Cognitive monitoring showed the 
strongest relations, correlating positively with intolerance of uncertainty, negative 
problem orientation, and negative beliefs about worry, and threat rating but not with 
positive beliefs. Surprisingly, child age did not correlate with any cognitive variables. 
The hypothesis that cognitive development measures would correlate positively with 
measures of worry was only partially supported. Child age correlated negatively with 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire-Child scores but did not correlate with 
worry/oversensitivity scores, while cognitive monitoring correlated positively with both 
measures of worry. 
B. Cognitive variables will correlate positively with measures of worry. The 
hypothesis that cognitive variables would correlate with worry was largely supported. 
Intolerance of uncertainty, negative problem orientation, and negative beliefs about worry 
correlated positively with both worry measures, while positive beliefs about worry and 
threat rating did not. Because these two variables do not appear related to worry in 
children, threat rating and positive beliefs were excluded from future analyses. 
Hypothesis Two: Cognitive development will predict scores on measures of 
negative beliefs about worry, intolerance of uncertainty and negative problem 
orientation. 
Three regression equations, one for each of the cognitive variables, were used to 
test this hypothesis. Because child age and all interpretations failed to correlate with 
cognitive variables, only cognitive monitoring was used as a measure of cognitive 
development. Recruitment site was entered in Block 1, and cognitive monitoring in Block 
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2. Models I and 2 for intolerance of uncertainty were significant, F (1, 78) = 9.85, 
p<.002, and F(2, 77) = 19.74,p<.001, respectively. Model 2 explained a total of33% of 
the variance in intolerance of uncertainty. The models for negative problem orientation 
were also significant,F(1, 78) = 6.67,p =.01,andF(2, 77)= 12.91,p<.001, 
respectively, and explained 23% of the variance in negative problem orientation. In the 
prediction of negative beliefs about worry, Modell failed to reach significance, F(I, 78) 
= 3.96,p = .05, and Model 2 was significant, F(2, 77) = 19.79,p < .001, explaining 32% 
of the variance in negative beliefs. Additional results are presented in Table 5. In 
summary, monitoring predicted intolerance of uncertainty, negative problem orientation, 
and negative beliefs about worry and explained a significant portion of the variance in 
each of the three variables. 
Table 5. 
Regressions Predicting IU, Negative Problem Orientation, and Negative Beliefs from 
Cognitive Monitoring. 
Dependent Variable 
IV NegProb. Negative Beliefs 
t t t 
Block I 
site -3.14** -2.58* -1.99* 
Block 2 
site -2.76** -2.15* -1.42 
monitoring 5.14** 4.21 ** 5.83** 
Note. *p<.05; **p<.OOI 
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Model assumptions were examined to determine the extent to which the models 
might generalize to other samples. Linearity was assessed by examining scatter plots, 
which indicated a roughly linear relationship between variables. Homescedasticity of 
each variable was evaluated by examining the distribution of residuals. Multivariate 
outliers were screened for by examining standardized residuals and influential cases 
scanned for by using DFit, Cook's distance values, and Mahalanobis distances (where 
large values are a concern). Standardized residuals for each of the three models were 
normally distributed. Multicollinearity of each model was evaluated by examining the 
variance inflation factor (VIF) (values> than 10 are problematic) and tolerance (values 
<.1 are problematic). All VIFS and tolerance values were within acceptable limits. 
Hypothesis Three: Intolerance of uncertainty, negative problem orientation, 
and negative beliefs about worry will predict child worry and cognitive development 
will moderate the relation, such that advanced development is associated with 
stronger predictive power of the cognitive variables. 
Two sets of regressions were conducted to test this hypothesis, the first set using 
child age as a moderator and the second with cognitive monitoring as a moderator. 
Although child age failed to show a direct association with worry, it could be that the 
relations between cognitive variables and worry are influenced by child age. To reduce 
the number of overall tests and associated error, regression models were run for Penn 
State Worry Questionnaire-Child scores only. Independent variables were centered before 
calculating the interaction term in order to reduce multicollinearity. 
For the first set of regressions, recruitment site was entered into Block 1, the 
cognitive variable, child age, and the interaction in Block 2. Models are presented in 
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Table 6. Block 1 and 2 of each model was significant, and the cognitive variable in each 
equation was significant. Child age was significant only in predicting intolerance of 
uncertainty. No interaction terms were significant. 
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Table 6. 
Cognitive Variables, Cognitive Development, and the Interactions in the Prediction of 
PSWQ-C Scores. 
Intolerance of Uncertainty 
Child Age Cognitive Monitoring 
t F ~RSq. t F ~RSq. 
Block 1 8.87** .12** Block 1 6.91 * .08* 
Site -2.97** Site -2.63* 
Block 2 8.85** .24** Block 2 9.91 ** .26** 
Site -1.04 Site -.93 
Age -2.18* Monitor 1.51 
IV 4.15** IV 3.74** 
Age* IV .24 Monitor*IV -.85 
Negative Problem Orientation (NP) 
Child Age Cognitive Monitoring 
t F ~RSq. t F ~RSq. 
Block 1 8.87** .12** Block 1 6.91 * .08* 
Site -2.98** Site -2.63* 
Block 2 9.41 ** .25** Block 2 11.09** .29** 
Site -1.45 Site -1.24 
Age -1.35 Monitor 1.77 
NP 4.35** NP 4.09** 
Age* NP .95 Monitor*NP -.37 
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Negative Beliefs(NB) 
Child Age Cognitive Monitoring 
t F ~RSq. t F ~RSq. 
Block 1 8.87** .12** Block 1 6.91 * .08* 
Site -2.98** Site -2.63* 
Block 2 9.83** .26** Block 2 10.24 ** .27** 
Site -1.41 Site -1.64 
Age -1.94 Monitor 1.19 
NB 4.22** NB 3.88** 
Age* NB 1.30 Monitor*NB -.18 
Note. For child age models, df= (1, 68) for Block 1; df= (4,65) for Block 2 
For cognitive monitoring models df = (1, 78) for Block I; df = (4, 75) for Block 2 
*p<.05**p<.01 
For the second set of regressions, cognitive monitoring was used as the measure 
of cognitive development. In Block I recruitment site was entered, followed by the 
cognitive variable, cognitive monitoring, and the interaction in Block 2. Results were 
similar to analyses using child age and are presented in Table 8. Again, the cognitive 
variable in each equation was significant, but no interaction terms were significant. 
Cognitive monitoring was not a significant predictor in any equation. 
Finally, an overall model was constructed to examine the relative predictive 
power of each of the three cognitive variables. Again, recruitment site was entered in 
Block 1 and all three cognitive variables in Block 2. Blocks I and 2 of the model were 
significant, F(1, 78) = 6.91, p = .01 and F (4, 75) = 12.08, p<.OOI, respectively. The R 
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Square change value was significant,p<.OOI, and Model 2 explained 38% of the variance 
in Penn State Worry Questionnaire-Child scores. Of the individual predictors, negative 
beliefs about worry emerged as significant, t = 2.39,p = .02, and there was a trend 
toward significance for negative problem orientation, t = 1.91,p = .06. IV was 
nonsignificant, t = .73,p = .47. In summary, the three cognitive variables significantly 
predicted worry but child age and cognitive monitoring did not moderate the association. 
Negative beliefs about worry appeared to have the strongest association with worry when 
the effects of negative problem orientation and intolerance of uncertainty were also 
accounted for. 
After each model, model assumptions were examined. Linearity and 
homescedasticity were assessed by examining scatter plots of standardized residuals 
against standardized predicted values. Inspection of the graphs revealed no violations of 
the assumptions. Multivariate outliers were screened for by examining standardized 
residuals and influential cases scanned for by using DFit, Cook's distance values, and 
Mahalanobis distances (where large values are a concern). Standardized residuals for 
each of the three models were normally distributed and multicollinearity did not appear to 
be problematic, as all VIFs and tolerance values were within acceptable limits. 
Hypothesis Four: Female children will report higher scores than male 
children on measures of intolerance of uncertainty, negative problem orientation, 
negative beliefs about worry, and worry. 
A series oft-tests was used to compare male and female children on the four 
cognitive variables and the two measures of worry. Because sample sizes are unequal, the 
pooled-variance estimate t-test was used. This test takes the different sample sizes into 
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account by weighting the sample variances according to the sample size (Field, 2005). 
The pooled variance was estimated using the following equation: 
The pooled variance estimate is then replaced in the standard t statistic calculation, where 
t:,. is the hypothesized difference between the two means, in this case 0: 
~-x,-i1 
t= Gi( 1·+ 1 ) 
{s,\n; n2 
To ensure equality of variances, Levene's test was conducted for each t-test and all were 
nonsignificant. Means, standard deviations, and t statistics are presented in Table 7. 
Results indicated that female children reported significantly higher levels of negative 
problem orientation and negative beliefs about worry compared to male children. 
Table 7. 
Pooled Variance t-test Resultsfor Sex Differences on Cognitive Variables. 
Males Females 
M(SD) M(SD) t P 
PSWQ-C 12.14 (7.87) 14.11 (5.98) -1.21 ns 
Worry/oversensitivity 5.00 (2.88) 6.37 (3.05) -l.37 ns 
luse 63.23 (18.66) 67.81 (2l.47) -.41 ns 
NPO 13.89 (10.44) 17.49 (8.40) -8.29 p<.OI 
Positive Beliefs 8.44 (2.83) 8.99 (3.17) -.15 ns 
Negative Beliefs 12.l7 (4.52) 14.22 (4.61) -3.17 p<.OI 
Note. df= 68, t> l.99 whenp. = .05 
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Hypothesis Five. The cognitive variables of negative beliefs about worry, 
intolerance of uncertainty, and negative problem orientation will predict group 
membership of high and low worriers. 
First, children were divided into high and low worry groups based on 
worry/oversensitivity scores. This type of methodology has been used previously in other 
studies to identify highly anxious children (Beidel & Turner, 1988; Mattison et aI., 1988; 
Saurez & Bell-Dolan, 2001) and a cut score ofT> 60 has been shown to discriminate 
clinical from nonclinical children (Mattison, Bagnato, & Brubaker, 1988). Using this cut 
score, 43 children were classified as low worriers and 27 as high worriers. A binary 
logistic regression was conducted with worry group as the dependent variable, 
recruitment site entered into Block 1 and negative problem orientation, intolerance of 
uncertainty, and negative beliefs entered into Block 2. Model 1 and Model 2 were 
significantX(df= 4) = 15.85,p = .003 andX2(df=(7) = 45.67,p<.001, indicating that 
both models resulted in a significant improvement in model prediction compared to the 
initial model containing only the constant (predicting that all children are low worriers). 
The Chi Square for Block 2 was significant,.x2 (df=3) = 29.83,p<.001, indicating that the 
addition of the cognitive variables resulted in significant improvement over Block 1. 
Overall, Model 2 accurately classified 87% of the children as high or low worriers, 
compared to 71 % in Modell. Of the predictors in the model, the Wald statistics were 
significant for recruitment site, Wald statistic = 5.47,p = .02, and intolerance of 
uncertainty, Wald statistic = 4.86,p = .03., exp b = 1.07. The odds that a child is in the 
high worry group increase by 1.07 for every 1 unit increase in intolerance of uncertainty. 
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Exploratory analyses. 
The current sample, although drawn from the community, included a greater than 
expected proportion of highly worried children. Several studies have shown that 
associations between variables differ based on the nature of the sample (community 
versus clinical). Because a significant portion of the children in this study scored above a 
clinical cut score (T>60 on the worry/oversensitivity scale), it could be that combining 
these two groups (clinical worriers and average worriers) "washed out" significant 
effects. To further examine this hypothesis, several analyses were conducted. 
One of the most surprising results of the study was the lack of association 
between child age and cognitive monitoring, given Bacow et al.'s (2009) finding that 
monitoring increased with age in their clinically anxious sample of children. With 
nonclinical adolescents, however, Cartwright-Hatton et al. (2004) found no relation 
between monitoring and age. Thus, it was hypothesized that these relations might be 
impacted by worry level. Partial correlations between age and monitoring were then 
calculated for high and low worry groups separately. Results showed significant but 
inverse correlations depending on worry group. For low worriers, cognitive monitoring 
decreased with child age (r = -.59, p<.OO I, n = 31), while for high worriers monitoring 
increased with age (r = .50, P = .02,n = 19). This relation is depicted graphically in 
Figure 3. It may be then, that cognitive monitoring is not a measure of cognitive 
development, but is better conceptualized as a cognitive variable more similar to 





















Figure 3. Relationship between child age and cognitive monitoring by 
worry group. High and low worry groups defined with a cut score of T> 60 
on the worry/oversensitivity scale 
Based on these results, it was hypothesized that worry group would moderate the 
relation between child age and the othe~ cognitive variables. Hypothesis two was 
therefore re-tested. Recruitment site, child age, worry group, and the interaction were 
entered into each equation. Regressions were conducted with recruitment site, age, worry 
group, and the age x group interaction as independent variables and intolerance of 
uncertainty, negative problem orientation, and negative beliefs as the dependent 
variables. Results are presented in Table 8. For significant interactions, slope values were 
calculated for each group and graphed. See Figures 4, 5, and 6 for graphs of interactions. 
The model for intolerance of uncertainty was significant, F (4, 65) = 13.54,p < .001, but 
no individual predictors were significant. The models for negative problem orientation, 
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F(4, 65) = 8.41,p<.0001, and negative beliefs, F(4, 65) = 8.09,p < .001, were significant. 
The interaction terms in both models were also significant. To further understand the 
correlations between child age and cognitive monitoring and the effect of worry group, a 
model was also constructed for cognitive monitoring. This model was also significant, (4, 
65) = 6.08,p < .00l. 
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Table 8. 




R2 t b b 
IV .02 .36 6.19 
Site -1.69 
Age -.98 
Worry group -.75 
Age*Worry group 1.34 
N eeative Problem .05* -2.19* 2.38 
Site -.96 
Age -2.58* 
Worry group -1.82 
Age*Worry group 2.23* 
Neeative Beliefs .06* -.67 1.95* 
Site -1.05 
Age -2.41 * 
Worry group -2.03* 
Age*Worry group 2.45* 
Monitorine .14** -1.33** 2.21 * 
Site -.98 
Age -3.83** 
Worry group -3.36** 
Age*Worry group 3.56** 
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Figure 4. The effect of worry group and age on negative problem 
orientation. High and low worry groups defined by a cut score of T>60 
on the worry/oversensitivity scale. A indicates significant slope value 
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Figure 5. The effect of worry group and age on negative beliefs about 
worry. High and low worry groups defmed by a cut score ofT>60 on 
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Figure 6. The effect of worry group and age on cognitive monitoring. 
High and low worry groups defined by a cut score of T>60 on the 
worry/oversensitivity scale. 1\ indicates significant slope value 
Because worry group moderated the relation between child age and the cognitive 
variables and, in tum, cognitive variables were hypothesized to predict worry, it seemed 
reasonable to next examine if the predictive power of the cognitive variables w~s also 
affected by worry group. That is, are the associations between the cognitive variables and 
worry also moderated by worry group? Three regression equations were conducted to 
predict Penn State Worry Questionnaire-Child scores, with recruitment site, the cognitive 
variable, worry group, and the interaction. Results presented in Table 9. The overall 
models for all three cognitive variables were significant, but an examination of individual 
predictors showed that negative beliefs and negative problem orientation significantly 
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predicted worry, while intolerance of uncertainty did not. No interaction terms were 
significant. 
Table 9. 




Variable t R2 F b b 















Note. df= 4, 65 for overall models; *p<.05; **p<.Ol; "=.05 
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DISCUSSION 
The current study examined worry and related cognition in a community sample 
of school aged children. First, preliminary analyses were conducted to investigate the 
validity of several measures, including a shortened version ofthe COELE, a measure of 
negative problem orientation adapted for children, and a measure of children's ability to 
generate mUltiple possible outcomes to a neutral scenario. Next, several paths from a 
larger conceptual model proposed to explain cognitive processes related to worry in 
children were tested. Hypotheses related to the power of threat interpretation, intolerance 
of uncertainty, negative problem orientation, and negative beliefs about worry to predict 
worry in children were tested. It was also hypothesized that cognitive development would 
moderate the association between the cognitive variables and worry, such that increasing 
development would be associated with stronger predictive power of the cognitive 
variables. Hypothesized sex differences in cognitive variables and worry were also 
examined. Finally, the utility of the cognitive variables in discriminating high from low 
worry groups was examined. 
Preliminary analyses. 
The shortened version of the COELE did not relate to other measures as expected 
and its psychometric properties were generally weak. Surprisingly, threat interpretation 
and threat ratings were not associated with worry. This was unexpected given the large 
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body of work linking worry and threat interpretation using other measures of threat 
interpretation (Bogels, Snieder, & Kindt, 2003; Taghavi, Moradi, Neshat-Doost, Yule, & 
Dalgleish, 2000). Results from this study also failed to replicate those of Saurez and Bell-
Dolan (2001), who using the original COELE, showed that worry correlated positively 
with interpretations of ambiguous stories, threat and worry ratings for both stories, and 
likelihood ratings. Although the COELE reportedly has strong psychometric properties, 
the original validation study is the only known study to date to use the measure. It may be 
that relations in the initial examination are specific to that sample and do not generalize 
well to other groups. It could also be that the adaptation of the interview from 12 to 6 
stories used in this study affected the measure's validity. A basic analysis of the measure 
psychometrics indicated low internal consistency of the scales and several scales failed to 
correlate with worry measures, suggesting that validity may have been affected. The 
telephone administration of the interview may have also influenced responses and 
measure psychometrics. Children may have been distracted during the interview, which 
would have interfered with their attention, processing of the information, and verbal 
responses. 
The measure of negative problem orientation adapted for children from the Social 
Problem Solving Inventory showed promising psychometric properties. Although a full 
examination of the measure's psychometrics is beyond the scope of the present study, 
preliminary estimates of internal consistency were adequate and the measure correlated 
with other variables as expected. Future studies aimed more specifically at examining the 
psychometrics of the measure would be beneficial. Specifically, work including sample 
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sizes adequate for a factor analysis and an examination of test-retest reliability would 
provide additional support for use of the adapted SPSI with children. 
Initial examination of the measure of children's ability to generate multiple 
possible outcomes for a neutral scenario showed no association with other measures of 
cognitive development, including both child age and cognitive monitoring. This suggests 
that the measure is not an adequate marker of cognitive development for this age range. It 
may be that these skills emerge earlier in life and are fully developed by age 8 years. If 
this is the case, from age 8 years on the ability to consider multiple possible future 
outcomes is relatively stable across development. It has been hypothesized that children's 
ability to generate multiple possible negative events is associated with the ability to 
catastrophize, or elaborate on threat (Ellis & Hudson, 2010; Vasey, 1993), and that this 
ability increases with development and is related to worry. Future work should determine 
if this ability is related to cognitive development in younger children. 
Hypothesis Testing. 
First, the association between the three cognitive development measures was 
examined. Generally, the measures were not correlated. Cognitive monitoring and child 
age also failed to correlate with one another. This was somewhat surprising given that 
others have found a positive association between the two variables (Bacow et aI., 2009). 
This finding is explained, however, by post-hoc exploratory analyses revealing that worry 
group influenced directionality of the correlations, washing out the results when groups 
were combined. When high and low worry groups were examined separately, age was 
associated with increases in cognitive monitoring in the high worry group but decreases 
in the low worry group. It seems then, that for typical or low worry children, attention to 
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thoughts decreases over time while it increases over time for worried children. Worried 
children may be hypervigilant to their thoughts, scanning for potential danger both 
internally and externally, and this increases over time. In contrast, typical children are 
less likely to be excessively attentive to internal stimuli and engage in less monitoring 
over time. It may be that cognitive monitoring serves as a maintaining factor in the worry 
process. In the future it will be important to determine the directionality of the relations, 
specifically if vigilance precedes worry or is a consequence of it, which cannot be 
determined from the current study. 
The hypothesis that the three cognitive development measures would correlate 
positively with worry-related cognition was only partially supported and varied by 
measure. Cognitive monitoring showed positive correlations with intolerance of 
uncertainty, negative beliefs about worry, negative problem orientation, and both 
measures of worry. Age failed to correlate with any of the worry related cognitive e 
variables and correlated negatively with worry when measured with the Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire-Child. It was somewhat surprising that child age correlated negatively with 
worry, given previous work suggesting increases or no difference with age (Chorpita et 
aI., 1997; Muris et aI., 2001). The all possible interpretations variable did not correlate 
with any of the worry related cognitive variables or with either measure of worry. The 
failure of the all possible interpretations measure to correlate with either measure of 
worry has important implications for our understanding of worry in children. This result 
suggests that children's ability to generate multiple possible explanations, whether 
negative or neutral, for an ambiguous event is not related to worry in children. This runs 
counter to the current definition of worry, which describes worry as a stream or chain of 
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internal content depicting multiple threatening scenarios. This result also fails to support 
the hypothesis that the ability to generate possible outcomes increases with child age and 
allows a child to worry in a generalized way (Ellis & Hudson, 2010; Vasey, 1993). For 
school age children imagining one possible threatening outcome may be sufficient to 
worry, raising the possibility that children are not worrying in the way that adults worry. 
It could be that children's worry involves greater focus on one particular threat rather 
than the chain of multiple negative outcomes that characterizes adult worry. Future work 
designed to test this hypothesis and to better understand the nature of children's worry 
would be beneficial. 
There was also a significant interaction between cognitive development, as 
measured by child age, and worry group in the prediction of intolerance of uncertainty, 
negative problem orientation, and negative beliefs about worry. Exploratory analyses 
showed that worry group moderated the relation between child age and two cognitive 
variables, with decreases in negative problem orientation with age for the low worry 
group and increases in negative beliefs about worry with age for the high worry group. 
Comer et al. (2009) found a similar pattern for intolerance of uncertainty in their sample 
of children, such that intolerance of uncertainty decreased with child age in a community 
sample but not a sample of children with anxiety disorders. The authors suggest that 
typical development is marked by an increased ability to tolerate uncertainty, a skill that 
fails to develop in children with clinical levels of anxiety (Comer, 2009). Similarly, 
learning adaptive ways of viewing problems and worry itself might also mark typical 
development. Results from this study indicate, however, that highly worried children 
experience an increase in negative problem orientation with child age and fail to 
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experience the decrease in negative beliefs about worry seen in children with lower levels 
of worry. 
Because directionality of the associations cannot be determined based on the 
study's design, there are two ways of interpreting these findings. First, it could be that 
worry interferes with the typical trajectory of worry related cognition that most children 
experience over time. For typical children, worry is likely infrequent, relatively short 
lived, and not particularly upsetting. Over time, as children experience worry as transient 
and nonthreatening, beliefs about uncertainty, problems, and worry itself become more 
balanced and adaptive. Children who experience excessive worry, however, may be 
more likely to find worry distressing because it is frequent, interferes with their lives, and 
is accompanied by physical symptoms. The expe~ence of such worry might in turn 
interfere with children's development of rational appraisals of worry (e.g., worry is 
unwanted, dangerous, and unpleasant) and situations that might trigger a worry response, 
such as facing a problem or ambiguity. 
An alternative explanation for the findings is that the directionality is reversed, so 
that deviations from the typical trajectory of worry related cognition increases the 
likelihood of worry. In particular, lacking confidence in problem solving skills might 
contribute to feelings of incompetence, increasing the likelihood of engaging in worry 
rather than proactive coping in the face of uncertainty or a problem. It could also be that 
parents playa role in facilitating the development of these cognitions in their children. 
Given the familial nature of anxiety, it is likely that anxious children have anxious 
parents. Anxious parents might embody these negative thinking styles and be unable to 
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model more adaptive ways of viewing uncertainty, problems, and the experience of worry 
itself for their children. 
The hypothesis that cognitive variables would be associated with worry was 
largely supported. Intolerance of uncertainty, negative beliefs about worry, and negative 
problem orientation correlated positively with worry, while positive beliefs did not. 
These results were consistent with other work which has shown positive associations 
between intolerance of uncertainty and worry (Comer et aI., 2009), and negative beliefs 
and worry (Bacow et aI., 2009) in children. This is the first known study to examine 
problem orientation and worry in children, but based on work with adults and 
adolescents, the positive relation between the two was as expected (Laugesen, Dugas, & 
Bukowski, 2003; Robichaud & Dugas, 2005). Positive beliefs, however, were not 
correlated with worry in this sample, in line with previous results in a sample of both 
clinical and non-clinical children (Bacow et aI., 2009) and adolescents (Cartwright-
Hatton et aI., 2004). However, the current findings contradict other work with adults 
(Davey, Tallis, & Capuzzo, 1996) and findings from Laugesen, Dugas, and Bukowski 
(2003), who showed that positive beliefs about worry explained substantial variance in 
worry scores in a community sample of adolescents. This suggests that worry's 
association with positive beliefs may not emerge until later in life and are not relevant for 
young children. Future work should examine positive beliefs as a maintaining factor in 
chronic worry. 
As expected, intolerance of uncertainty, negative problem orientation, and 
negative beliefs about worry significantly predicted Penn State Worry Questionnaire-
Child scores. Of the three predictors, negative beliefs about worry emerged as the 
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strongest. Cognitive development did not moderate the predictive power of the cognitive 
variables, indicating that the variables are significantly related to worry regardless of 
developmental level (as measured by child age and cognitive monitoring). This suggests 
that children as young as age eight years old experience intolerance of uncertainty, 
negative problem orientation, and negative beliefs about worry, and that these thoughts 
predict worry in much the same way they do in adults. Contrary to hypotheses, advanced 
development is not associated with higher scores on measures of the cognitive variables, 
and worry's relation with intolerance of uncertainty, negative beliefs about worry, and 
negative problem orientation did not differ statistically across development. Further, 
exploratory analyses showed that the predictive power of the cognitive variables held 
constant across worry group. It seems then, that the set of cognitive variables are related 
to worry in the same way, across worry level and cognitive development. 
This finding has important implications for treatment and prevention of worry in 
children. Because many of the same cognitive processes associated with worry in adults 
appear to be at work in worried children, adapting adult treatment protocols to 
developmentally appropriate levels may be effective intervention tools. For example, 
metacognitive therapy, focused on modifying negative beliefs about worry, has recently 
been shown to be effective in samples of adults with anxiety disorders (Wells & King, 
2006). The finding that similar processes are involved in high and low worry groups also 
suggests that programs designed to prevent the development of excessive worry may also 
be advantageous. Intolerance of uncertainty, negative problem orientation, and negative 
beliefs are associated with worry, even at normal levels, and so would be accessible for 
all children. Learning skills to modify these beliefs and tolerate uncertainty may help 
98 
children cope with worry and prevent at risk children from developing clinical problems 
in the future. Future work is needed with clinically anxious children, however, and 
studies should examine if associations between these variables are also similar across 
clinically anxious and nonanxious children. 
Exploratory analyses revealed a complex relation between cognitive monitoring, 
worry, and cognitive variables. Results from previous studies examining the relation 
between cognitive monitoring and worry severity have shown that nonclinical children 
reported higher levels of monitoring compared to clinical children (Bacow et aI., 2009), a 
finding that has been documented with adolescents as well (Cartwright-Hatton, 2004). 
Exploratory analyses accounting for the effects of both clinical severity and child age 
hinted at developmental trends in cognitive monitoring that were impacted by worry 
severity. In the low worry group, the tendency to monitor thoughts decreases with child 
age, a pattern also seen with intolerance of uncertainty (although not significant 
statistically), negative problem orientation, and negative beliefs about worry. It seems 
logical that the ability to recognize thoughts would follow a similar pattern to the other 
cognitive variables, as awareness of thoughts would necessarily precede evaluations 
(including intolerance of uncertainty, negative problem orientation, and negative beliefs 
about worry) of them. Typical development may include an ability to disengage from 
thoughts, a skill that is underdeveloped or interfered with by severe worry. Bacow et al 
(2009) suggests that increased awareness of thoughts may not be sufficient to lead to 
anxiety problems. However, it may be a necessary prerequisite for the set of negative 
cognitions that explain significant variance in worry in children. 
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Results for the effect of sex on worry and worry related cognition were mixed. 
The current study found no differences between male and female children on Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire-Child or worry/oversensitivity scores. Previous work has not shown 
any difference consistently, with some studies reporting higher worry in females while 
others report no difference (Chorpita et aI., 1997; Muris et aI., 2001; Reynolds & 
Richmod, 1978). 
Male and female children differed significantly on two cognitive variables, with 
female children reporting higher levels of negative beliefs about worry and negative 
problem orientation. Previous work with children showed no sex differences in positive 
beliefs, negative beliefs, or cognitive monitoring in children (Bacow et aI., 2009) or 
adolescents (Cartwright-Hatton, 2004), although work with community samples of adults 
has shown higher levels of negative problem orientation in women (D'Zurilla, Maydeu-
Olivares, & Kant, 1998; Robichaud, Dugas, & Conway, 2003). 
Several explanations for sex effects have been proposed. Robichaud et ai. (2003) 
hypothesized that women's negative problem orientation could be related to their 
increased feelings of powerlessness, perceived inability to control problems, and lack of 
confidence in their coping abilities. Similarly, Stavosky and Borkovec (1987) suggest 
that women (and girls) may adopt worry as a problem solving skill, as it reflects a more 
traditional feminine role. That is, worry is a less instrumental and assertive way to solve a 
problem, a style stereotypically associated with femininity. The authors also suggest that 
women might be encouraged to adopt these strategies for coping with problems, rather 
than a more aggressive or confrontational approach, and receive reinforcement for using 
them. Further, women might not be exposed to alternative problem solving strategies. 
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Stavosky and Borkovec (1987) strongly advocate for the idea that the effects of 
biological sex and gender role identification be separated. For example, Green (1980, as 
cited in Stavosky & Borkovec, 1987) found differences in adolescent depression based on 
gender role identification but not sex. Specifically, feminine or undifferentiated gender 
role identification was associated with depression. Future work might consider social and 
environmental factors that contribute to children's perceptions that problems and 
uncertainty are threatening, overwhelming, and intolerable and that worry is an internal 
experience to be fearful of. 
Results from this study supported the final hypothesis, indicating that the 
cognitive variables distinguished between high and low worriers. Intolerance of 
uncertainty, negative beliefs about worry, and negative problem orientation successfully 
predicted whether children fell above or below the clinical cut score on the 
worry/oversensitivity scale, and the model overall accurately classified 87% of children. 
Of the cognitive variables, only intolerance of uncertainty made a significant contribution 
to the prediction. This result is similar to that of Laugesen et al. (2003) who showed that 
intolerance of uncertainty and negative problem orientation, but not positive beliefs or 
cognitive avoidance, accurately discriminated moderate from high worriers in a 
community sample of adolescents. Similarly, Cartwright-Hatton et at. (2004) showed that 
adolescents with emotional disorders endorsed more negative beliefs about worry 
compared to nonclinical adolescents, but not more positive beliefs or cognitive 
monitoring. Of note, however, Bacow et al. (2009) failed to find differences between 
children with anxiety disorders and groups on negative beliefs about worry. More work is 
needed in establishing consistent relations between these variables. 
101 
Implications for a conceptual model. 
Results from this study have important implications for the conceptual model 
proposed earlier. Support for the paths between worry and intolerance of uncertainty, 
negative beliefs about worry, and negative problem orientation was found in children as 
young as age eight years. Although support for threat interpretation was not found in this 
study, caution should be used when interpreting these results. A large body of literature 
has supported the association between information processing and worry in children and 
it seems most likely that the lack of significant results in this study are unique to the 
sample or to the methodology used (namely shortening the COELE interview used by 
Saurez & Bell-Dolan, 2001). This study also suggests that positive beliefs about worry 
are not particularly relevant to worry in children between the ages of 8 and 12 years old. 
The influence of cognitive development on worry related variables appears to differ as a 
function of worry severity, suggesting that it will be important to account for the 
influence of worry severity in future models of worry in children. 
Limitations of the current study. 
Although this study has a number of strengths, it is also bound by some 
limitations. First, the nature of the sample undoubtedly affected the results of this study. 
The sample was not drawn at random, and although a community sample, the group was 
biased toward high levels of worry, as evidenced by the average Penn State Worry Child 
Questionnaire-Child and worry/oversensitivity scores. Children who experience higher 
levels of worry (or their parents, or both) may have been more likely to participate in the 
study because it was personally relevant to them. Results may be better understood as 
coming from two distinct populations including a highly worried group and a more 
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typical group, rather than from the same population. Exploratory analyses including 
worry group as moderator support this idea. However, there are also implications for 
splitting the sample into two smaller groups. First, differences may exist that the current 
analyses were not able to detect due to limited sample size and resulting power. Second, 
results may be specific to this sample and may not generalize to other groups. Future 
work should further test these associations to cross-validate findings from this study. 
A second limitation related to power is the relatively small number of male 
children, which may have restricted the ability to find differences based on child sex. 
Prevalence differences between males and females in worry and GAD may in fact have 
contributed to potential sampling bias, as worried children are more likely to be female. 
A larger sample size with equal numbers of male and female children could have better 
answered questions about sex differences in worry and related cognitive variables. 
Third, the unequal distribution across the age range, especially at the low and high 
ends, limited power in analyses dealing with child age. Although equal numbers of 
children from all ages were invited to participate, no seven-year-old children returned 
completed packets. Most likely the amount of material was overwhelming for children at 
that reading level, although all measures but one (the SPSI-Child Adaptation) have been 
validated for children of that age. Because most children were aged 9 and 10 years, there 
may not have been sufficient variability to detect differences related to cognitive 
development. 
Finally, the cross-sectional design of the study prevents any directional or causal 
conclusions. Associations between cognitive development, the cognitive variables, and 
worry are complex and appear to change as s function of worry severity. In particular, the 
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finding that child age is associated with increases in intolerance of uncertainty, negative 
beliefs about worry, and negative problem orientation in the high worry group should be 
examined longitudinally. 
Summary and future directions. 
In summary, it appears that a cognitive model of worry can be applied to children 
as young as eight years old. Intolerance of uncertainty, negative beliefs about worry and 
negative problem orientation appear to be closely associated with worry in this sample, 
while positive beliefs about worry are not. Specifically, negative beliefs about worry 
demonstrated the strongest association with continuous worry measures while intolerance 
of uncertainty was the strongest predictor of high and low worry group. The role of 
information processing is less clear based on this study, and further work is needed in this 
area. Cognitive development appears to influence worry related cognition as a function of 
worry severity, where typical development is marked by a decrease in intolerance of 
uncertainty, negative problem orientation, and negative beliefs about worry. Overall, 
results from this study suggest that intolerance of uncertainty, negative problem 
orientation, and negative beliefs about worry significantly predict worry in children, 
regardless of child age or worry level, and negative problem orientation and intolerance 
of uncertainty have especially strong associations with worry. 
This study makes an important contribution to a complex and, at times, 
contradictory literature. Future work could disentangle the complicated relations between 
cognitive development, worry, and cognitive variables in several ways. Understanding 
worry in children must account for a number of variables that could alter or moderate 
relations between variables, including but not limited to child sex, age, and worry 
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severity. Emerging evidence suggests that each of these variables influences the 
directionality and/or strength of association between worry and related variables, and 
drawing conclusions at this time is difficult due to what appears to be inconsistent 
findings across studies. Future work should account for potential moderators in order to 
contribute to the literature in a way that allows for comparisons across studies. What 
appear to be contradictory findings might be due to the use of samples of different ages or 
worry severity level. Other conflicting findings might be explained by the study design 
and more specifically which cognitive variables are included in the analyses. To date, 
studies of worry in children have examined a single cognitive variable and its association 
with worry. Including more than one cognitive variable in the study design helps to 
distinguish which variables are most important relative to the other variables. Future 
work designed to account for relations between these variables and their association with 
worry will be important in clearly identifying the most relevant cognitive variables. 
In addition, cognitive models should be tested in children younger than age eight 
years. To date no studies have examined a comprehensive model in children aged seven 
years or younger. Measures of intolerance of uncertainty and metacognition have been 
validated for use with children seven years old; however no known studies have 
examined the kind of comprehensive cognitive model tested here. In addition, developing 
other valid assessment measures of children's worry related cognition, beyond child self-
report, would allow for the investigation of these constructs in eve younger children. 
Understanding the lower limit for the applicability of these models has important 
implications for treatment. If, as has been demonstrated in this study and others, cognitive 
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variables are strongly associated with worry in children, targeted interventions aimed at 
altering these thoughts could be beneficial in treatment. 
Relatedly, longitudinal studies would clarify issues related to the temporal 
relations between cognitive variables, worry, and cognitive development. Studies 
designed to understand issues of timing, such as when these cognitions develop, how they 
become problematic, and their sequential relation with worry will be especially important 
in the creation of prevention and treatment programs in youth. 
Additional work is also needed to test the applicability of this model to clinical 
samples of children. Although the current sample had a substantial proportion of 
clinically worried children, the model should be tested with children recruited from an 
anxiety clinic and in those diagnosed with GAD. Such a model could then be used to 
devise GAD and worry specific interventions for use in treating children. 
Finally, the influence of parenting on the relevant cognitive variables should also 
be examined in the future. Cognitive variables have demonstrated a predictive relation to 
worry in children ages 8 to 12 years. Understanding how such beliefs about worry, 
uncertainty, and problems develop in children could inform prevention and intervention 
efforts. One likely source of influence is parents and family environment factors. 
Examining parental beliefs and specific parenting behaviors could help us to understand 
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Children's Opinions of Everyday Life Events 
Interview 
Story #l--Your mother usually gets home from work around 5:30 PM. One afternoon 
while you are watching TV, the phone rings at 6:30 PM and you realize your mom is not 
home yet. What do you think has happened? 
1. How would you feel if this happened to you? 
Worried 
Sad 
not at all a little somewhat 
123 
 
2. How scary is this situation for you? 
1 2 3 
not at all a little somewhat 
3. How likely do you think this is to happen to you? 
123 















Story #2-0ne of your close friends tells you that another one of your friends is having a 
birthday party next Saturday. Your friend received a special invitation in the mail and 
you have not received one. What do you think has happened? 
1. How would you feel if this happened to you? 
Worried 
Sad 
not at all a little somewhat 
123 
 
2. How scary is this situation for you? 
1 2 3 
not at all a little somewhat 














not at all a little somewhat very much extremely 
Story #3-0ne day before starting the lesson, your teacher asks you to stay after class. 
What do you think has happened? 
1. How would you feel if this happened to you? 
126 
not at all a little somewhat very much extremely 
Worried 1 2 3 4 5 
Sad 1 2 3 4 5 
2. How scary is this situation for you? 
1 2 3 4 5 
not at all a little somewhat very much extremely 
3. How likely do you think this is to happen to you? 
1 2 3 4 5 
not at all a little somewhat very much extremely 
Story #4-- While you are trying to go to sleep, you hear loud voices in your parents' 
bedroom. Your dad is yelling at your mom and she screams back at him. What do you 
think has happened? 
1. How would you feel if this happened to you? 
Worried 
Sad 
not at all a little somewhat 
123 
 
2. How scary is this situation for you? 
1 2 3 
not at all a little somewhat 














not at all a little somewhat very much extremely 
Story #5-0n the first day of summer camp, some kids are talking and when you 
approach them you overhear them saying mean things about you. What do you think has 
happened? 
1. How would you feel if this happened to you? 
Worried 
Sad 
not at all a little somewhat 
123 
 
2. How scary is this situation for you? 
1 2 3 
not at all a little somewhat 




















Story #6-Your English teacher asks you to read a paragraph in front of the class. In the 
middle of your reading, the teacher tells you "Sit down, that's wrong" and asks someone 
else to continue reading. What do you think has happened? 
1. How would you feel if this happened to you? 
Worried 
Sad 
not at all a little somewhat 
123 
 
2. How scary is this situation for you? 
1 2 3 
not at all a little somewhat 
3. How likely do you think this is to happen to you? 
123 

















Directions. This form is about worrying. Worrying happens when you are scared about something and you 
think about it a lot. People sometimes worry about school, their family, their health, things coming up in 
the future, or other kids of things. For each sentence that you read, circle the answer that best tells how true 
that sentence is about you. 
1. My worries really bother me. never sometimes most times always 
true true true true 
2. I don't really worry about things. never sometimes most times always 
true true true true 
3. Many things make me worry. never sometimes most times always 
true true true true 
4. I know I shouldn't worry about things, but never sometimes most times always 
just can't help it. true true true true 
5. When I am under pressure, I worry a lot. never sometimes most times always 
true true true true 
6. I am always worrying about something. never sometimes most times always 
true true true true 
7. I find it easy to stop worrying when I want. never sometimes most times always 
true true true true 
8. When I finish one thing, I start to worry never sometimes most times always 
about everything else. true true true true 
9. I never worry about anything. never sometimes most times always 
true true true true 
10. I've been a worrier all my life. never sometimes most times always 
true true true true 
11. I notice that II have been worrying about never sometimes most times always 
things. true true true true 
12. Once I start worrying, I can't stop. never sometimes most times always 
true true true true 
13. I worry all the time. never sometimes most times always 
true true true true 
14. I worry about things until they are done. never sometimes most times always 
true true true true 
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RCMAS 
Read each question carefully. Put a circle around the word YES if you think it is true 
about you. Put a circle around the word NO if you think it is not true about you. 
1. I have trouble making up my mind. 
2. I get nervous when things do not go the right way for me. 
3. Others seem to do things easier than I can. 
4. I like everyone I know. 
5. Often I have trouble getting my breath. 
6. I worry a lot of the time. 
7. I am afraid of a lot of things. 
8. I am always kind. 
9. I get mad easily. 
10. I worry about what my parents will say to me. 
11. I feel that others do not like the way I do things. 
12. I always have good manners. 
13. It is hard for me to get to sleep at night. 
14. I worry about what other people think about me. 
15. I feel alone even when there are people with me. 
16. I am always good. 
17. Often I feel sick in my stomach. 
18. My feelings get hurt easily. 
19. My hands feel sweaty. 
20. I am always nice to everyone. 
21. I am tired a lot. 
22. I worry about what is going to happen. 
23. Other children are happier than I. 
24. I tell the truth every single time. 
25. I have bad dreams. 
26. My feelings get hurt easily when I am fussed at. 
27. I feel someone will tell me I do things the wrong way. 
28. I never get angry. 
29. I wake up scared some of the time. 
30. I worry when I go to bed at night. 
31. It is hard for me to keep my mind on my schoolwork. 
32. I never say things I shouldn't. 
33. I wiggle in my seat a lot. 
34. I am nervous. 
35. A lot of people are against me. 
36. I never lie. 












































































SPSI-R (Child Adaptation) 
You are going to read some sentences about how people might think, feel, and act when 
they have important problems in their life. I'm not talking about everyday problems. The 
kinds of problems I am talking about are important in your life that bother you, but you 
don't know right away how to change it or how to make it stop bothering you. You know 
you have a problem when you feel puzzled, stumped, uncertain, or confused about 
something. You will read each statement and decide which number tells how true the 
statement is about you. Then circle the number. Remember not to skip any! 
How true is the statement about you? 
o - not at all true 
1- a little true 
2 -medium amount true 
3- very much true 
4 - extremely true 
1. I worry too much about things instead of trying to fix them. 
o 1 234 
2. I feel afraid when I have a big problem to solve. 
o 1 234 
3. When I have a big choice to make I feel scared and not sure that I can do it. 
o 1 234 
4. Sometimes I can't solve a problem at first. Then I think that in try hard and don't give 
up I will solve the problem later. 
o 1 234 
5. When I have a problem, most of the time I think there is a way to fix it. 
o 1 2 3 4 
6. I wait for problems to go away before I try to fix them. 
o 1 234 
7. In can't solve a problem right away, I get angry and feel stuck. 
o 1 2 3 4 
8. When I have a big problem to solve, I feel like I can't fix it no matter how hard I try. 
o 1 2 3 4 
9. When I have a problem, I put off trying to solve it for as long as I can. 
o 1 2 3 4 
10. I try hard not to deal with problems in my life. 
o 1 234 
11. Hard problems in my life make me very upset. 
o 1 2 3 4 
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12. When I have a problem in my life I try to solve it head on. 
o 1 2 3 4 
13. I try not to think about problems instead of trying to fix them. 
o 1 234 
14. I believe that I can fix a problem with no help if! keep trying hard. 
o 1 234 
15. I put off problems until it is too late. 
o 1 234 
16. I spend more time trying to stay away from my problems than trying to fix them. 
o 1 234 
17. When I try to fix a problem I get so upset that it's hard to think. 
o 1 234 
18. I hate solving problems in my life. 
o 123 4 
19. I try to see problems as a way to learn something new. 
o 1 2 3 4 
20. I feel sad and stuck when I have a big problem to solve. 
o 1 234 
21. When I have a big problem, I ask someone to help me solve it. 
o 1 234 
22. When I can't fix a problem on my first try, I get sad and give up. 
o 1 234 
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IUSC 
How well do these statements describe you? Please answer questions #1 through #27 
with this scale. 
1 
Not at all 
2 3 
Somewhat 
1. Doubts stop me from having strong opinions. 
4 
123 4 
2. Being unsure means that a person is mixed-up. 
1 234 





1 2 3 4 5 
4. It's not fair that we can't predict the future. 
123 4 
5. I can't relax if! don't know what will happen tomorrow. 
5 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Not knowing what will happen in the future makes me uneasy, anxious or stressed. 
1 234 5 
7. Surprise events upset me greatly. 
123 4 5 
8. It frustrates me to not have all of the information I need. 
12345 
9. Not knowing what could happen keeps me from enjoying life. 
1 2 345 
10. One should always think ahead to avoid surprises. 
1 234 5 
11. Plans can be ruined by things you didn't think would happen. 
1 2 345 
12. When it is time to do things, not knowing what could happen keeps me from acting. 
1 234 5 
13. Being unsure of things means that I am not great. 
1 234 5 
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How well do these statements describe you? 
123 
Not at all Somewhat 
4 5 
Very much 
14. When I am not sure of something I can't go forward. 
12345 
15. When I am not sure of something I can't work very well. 
12345 
16. Other kids have less doubts than I do. 
123 4 5 
17. Not knowing what will happen makes me unhappy or sad. 
12345 
18. I always want to know what will happen to me in the future. 
12345 
19. I don't like being taken by surprise. 
123 4 5 
20. The smallest doubt can keep me from doing things. 
12345 
21. I should be able to prepare for everything in advance. 
12345 
22. Being unclear about things means that I am not confident. 
12345 
23. It's not fair that other kids are more sure of things. 
12345 
24. Not knowing what can happen keeps me from sleeping well. 
1 2 3 4 5 
25. I must get away from all situations where I don't know what will happen. 
12345 
26. Things that are unclear stress me. 
123 4 5 
27. I don't like being undecided about the future. 
1 234 5 
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MCQC 
We are interested in how young people think. Listed below are a number of beliefs that 
people have. Please read each item and say how much you generally agree with by 
circling a number. Please respond to all the items. There are no right or wrong answers. 
Do not Agree Agree Agree very 
agree slightly moderately much 
123 4 
1. If! worry about things now, I will have fewer problems in the future. 
123 4 
2. It is not a good idea to worry because worrying is bad for me. 
123 4 
3. I often notice the thoughts I have in my head. 
123 4 
4. If I worry a lot, I could make myself sick. 
1 234 
5. When I am thinking about a problem in my head, I take note of how my mind works. 
123 4 
6. If I did not get a worry thought out of my head and then something bad happened, it 
would be my fault. 
123 4 
7. Worrying about things helps me to be organized and keep my stuff in order. 
123 4 
8. My worrying thoughts keep going, no matter how hard I try to put them out of my 
head. 
1 2 3 4 
9. When I am confused, worrying helps me sort things out. 
123 4 
10. I can't stop thinking ofthe things that I worry about. 
1 234 
11. I try hard to keep track of the thoughts that I have in my head. 
1 234 
12. I should be able to tell myself to stop and start thinking about things whenever I want 
to. 








Agree Agree very 
moderately much 
3 4 
13. Worrying might make me go crazy. 
123 4 
14. I am always thinking about the thoughts in my head. 
123 4 
15. I pay a lot of attention to the way I think. 
123 4 
16. Worrying helps me feel better. 
123 
17. If I can't stop my thoughts, I am no good. 
4 
123 4 
18. Once I start worrying about something, I cannot stop. 
123 4 
19. If! can't stop my thoughts, bad things will happen. 
123 4 
20. Worrying helps me solve problems. 
1 2' 3 4 
21. It is bad to think about certain things. 
123 4 
22. If! couldn't be in control of what I think, I would fall apart. 
1 234 
23. I need to worry in order to get my work done. 
123 4 
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Poster at the Annual Behavior and Cognitive Therapies Convention, November 
15-18, Philadelphia, PA. 
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the Annual American Psychological Association Convention, August 17-20, San 
Francisco, CA. 
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Association Convention, August 17-20, San Francisco, CA. 
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Parental Behaviors and Anxiety in Black and White Young Adults. Poster at the 
University of Louisville Summer Research Opportunity Program, August 1 st, 
Louisville, KY. 
Meltzer, M., Agwu, C., Greenberg, B., Kertz, S., Skelton, A., Vittengl, J.Wessel, A., 
Wooldridge, C. (2006). The Correlation Between Student Embracement of 
the Liberal Arts and Expected Annual Income. Poster at the Midwestern 
Psychological Association, May, Chicago IL. 
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Wooldridge, C. (2006). Exploring the Structure of Liberal Arts 
Acculturation and its Prediction of College Students' Well-being. Poster at the 
Midwestern Psychological Association, May, Chicago, IL. 
Clinical Experience 
07/20 1 O-present 
McLean Hospital 
Behavioral Health Partial Program 
Supervisor: Throstur Bjorgvinsson, PhD 
Worked in a CBT and DBT oriented skills based partial hospital program for individuals 
with Axis I and Axis II personality disorders. Conducted six groups per week and met 
with patients for individual skills coaching. Approximately five hours of supervision 
were provided weekly. 
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0812009-05/2010 
University of Louisville 
Psychological Services Center, Mindfulness and 
Acceptance Based Behavior Therapy Treatment Team 
Supervisor: Paul Salmon, Ph.D. 
Several hours per week spent providing mindfulness and acceptance based treatments to 
individuals with anxiety and depressive symptoms. Weekly group and individual 
supervision meetings and mindfulness practice were also included. 
0812006-07/2009 
University of Louisville 
Psychological Services Center, Cognitive-Behavioral 
Therapy for Anxiety Disorders Team 
Supervisor: Janet Woodruff-Borden, Ph. D. 
Several hours per week focused on providing cognitive-behavioral treatment to 
individuals with anxiety disorders and depression. Other responsibilities included 
assessment, client reports, observing clients, and attending weekly supervision meetings. 
0512007 -0512010 
University of Louisville 
Psychological Services Center, Assessment Practicum 
Supervisors: Bernadette Walter, Ph.D. & David Winsch, 
PhD. 
Conducted advanced placement, Attention Deficit-Hyperactivity Disorder, and full 
diagnostic assessments of children and adults. Activities included test administration, 
scoring, interpretation, and the preparation of integrated reports. Results were also 
presented to the client in a verbal feedback session. 
04/08-05/08 
University of Louisville 
Girls Intervention Group - Wilkerson Elementary 
School 
Supervisor: Janet Woodruff-Borden, Ph.D. 
Conducted 8 week intervention group designed to help at-risk girls ages 11 and 12 
prepare for transition from elementary to middle school. Group met once per week for 
two hours and focused on issues such as self-image, assertiveness, peer relationships, and 
stress management. 
06/2005-08/2005 Childcare Practicum 
Edgewood Children's Center Supervisor: Anne Marie Potchen, M.S.W. 
Worked with children suffering from emotional and behavior disorders, developed and 
evaluated behavior modification plans, monitored behavioral and psychological status, 
intervened in crisis situations, including the use of physical restraint, taught behavioral, 




University of Louisville 
Teaching Assistant: Introductory Psychology 
Supervisor: Edna Ross, Ph.D. 
Taught six recitation sections over two semesters. Responsibilities included material 
preparation, delivering lectures, grading assignments, assisting students, proctoring 
exams, and recording and calculating grades. 
Editorial Activities 
Ad hoc reviewer, Journal of Anxiety Disorders 
Professional Talks 
"Helping Your Child Cope with Stress and Worry." Presented at the Family Scholar 
House, February 25th, 2010. 
"Cognitive Behavioral Treatment of Com or bid OCD and OCPD." Case Conference 
Presentation, University of Louisville, March 25th, 2009. 
"Stress and Anxiety." Guest lecture at Jefferson Community College on the nature and 
treatment of stress and anxiety disorders. April 24th, 2008. 
"Student Involvement in Faculty Research: Making the Most out of Research Lab/Team 
Experiences." Panel Discussion at the Kentucky Psychological Association Convention, 
November 9th , 2007. 
"Helping your child succeed in school." Workshop presented for parents at Semple 










Association for Behavior and Cognitive Behavior 
Therapies 
Association for Psychological Science 
American Psychological Association 
Psi Chi National Psychology Honor Society 
University of Louisville Depression Center Conference 
Volunteer at Kentucky Psychological Association 
Convention 
Volunteer at Celebrating Women Conference 
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